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Introduction
“A criminal justice system is a mirror in which a whole society can see the darker
outlines of its face. Our ideas of justice and evil take on visible form in it, and thus
we see ourselves in deep relief” (Reiman 2003, 1).

The concept of incarceration in Germany is likely to conjure up horrific images of
the Holocaust, or of secret Stasi prisons in East Germany. Today, an Internet image search
of German prisons produces a curious mixture of cozy dorm room-like cells and barbaric
concentration camps. The latter, of course, is a solemn reminder of Germany's gruesome
past. The former, however, shows a reality that many Americans are perhaps more
unprepared for: that of a prison that is minimally punitive and that allows its inhabitants
to retain some semblance of a life outside of prison. Americans' comments on these
pictures, part of a photo series by artist Jürgen Chill, show consistent outrage: that such
cells reveal an unthinkable softness on crime, and that this “softness” somehow flies in
the face of justice (“German Prison Cells” 2009).
After years of being continually appalled by the heinous hardness of U.S. prisons,
I found these images, which show a level of humanity within the prison space, to be both
refreshing and comforting. Having developed a set of criticisms and opinions about
prisons and incarceration that rely heavily on relational and non-punitive policies and
practices, I was impressed by the German system, which allows for day-leaves, for
mothers to continue to care for their children, and for abbreviated sentences, and which
emphasizes reintegration into society after release. Furthermore, German incarceration
rates are much lower than those in the United States. The percentage of the German
population that is incarcerated is one-eighth of that in the U.S., and the percentage of
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women who are incarcerated is even smaller (Jones et al. 2011).
Additionally, Germany, with its puzzling mix of hard-working self-sufficiency and
communalistic values, has always fascinated me. The notion of Germans as a serious
people, committed to their work, and intolerant of laziness or inefficiency, is not wholly
inaccurate, yet they support and have created a net of social welfare programs better than
what can be found in most of the western, capitalist world. Since the end of World War II,
Germany has had to rebuild from a state of almost complete destruction, and it has done
so with amazing resolve and success. Today, it is the largest economy in Europe and the
fifth largest in the world (CIA 2012). Yet Germany's social welfare market makes it a far
more socialist nation than most other capitalist countries throughout the world. Even
before Unification, West Germany's interpretation of capitalism was much different than
that of many liberal capitalist states throughout the world. From an American perspective,
East and West Germany prior to Unification were perhaps more similar than they were
different, yet within Germany, this divide was quite stark.
The extent to which East and West Germany represented their respective
economic theories can be seen in their differing ideologies of incarceration, with East
German prisons relying primarily on a socialist or Marxist model, and West German
prisons more closely echoing capitalist views of punishment. In the years since
Unification, the merger of these two systems has mirrored the continual process of
unifying these two states. Socialist and capitalist influences can both be seen in the
criminal legal institutions of Germany, revealing the extent to which these influences
determine the social, political, and economic climate of contemporary Germany.
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Furthermore, the specificities of women's prisons reveal constructions of gender,
femininity, and womanhood in each state; the differences and developments in these
constructions have been reproduced in the prison space through policies and programs
directed towards incarcerated women.
This unique recent history of Germany makes it an excellent case study through
which to view the relationship between a country and its women's prisons. The
artificiality and relative brevity of Germany's East-West divide made it an experiment in
the power of political and economic systems to create widely differing criminal legal
institutions; these institutions thus provide an extraordinary window into gender, crime,
and punishment in post-WWII Germany.

I. Theoretical Framework
a. The Prison as a Product of its Historical, Political, Economic and Social Context:
Clearly, the German prison system is much more than a reactionary institution that
has simply adapted itself to current criminal trends in the country. It is a unique system
that has been influenced by both capitalism and communism, and has, at times, struggled
to find a balance of these two influences in order to most appropriately reflect the needs
of women inside and outside of the prison space. In trying to understand German
women's prisons in the context of Germany's unique history, it is relevant to study the
techniques and theories that scholars and critics of the United States' prison have
developed in order to trace prisons from their historical roots.
Many such scholars and critics of the U.S. prison system have traced its historical
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intersection with the institution of slavery (Franklin 1998, Davis 2003). They argue that
the current U.S. prison system is no accident, nor is it a natural reaction to criminal
behavior in the U.S. Rather, it is a racialized institution shaped by other racialized
American institutions—namely, slavery and subsequent convict lease and Jim Crow laws.
Both Angela Davis and Bruce Franklin point out a devastating loophole in the progress
narrative of American freedom: that while the thirteenth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution supposedly banned slavery, its particular wording wrote slavery into the
Constitution “as a punishment for crime” (Franklin 1998, 17). This enabled the modern
American prison-industrial complex to become the monstrosity that it is today.
Yet even within the United States, prisons have developed differently based on
regional variances. Franklin, in his introduction to Prison Writing in the 20th Century,
explains how cotton slavery plantations in the South became cotton prison plantations,
while prisons in the North—on a smaller scale—were often used for political prisoners
and labor union organizers (Franklin 1998, 20). These regional differences show how
even within one supposedly united country, social, political, and economic variances can
cause marked differences in the development of the prison systems in neighboring
regions or states.
My intervention throughout this project is to better understand German women's
prisons by placing them in the context of Germany's social, political, and economic
developments since the end of World War II. I argue that the German prison system is
particularly notable because of its recent history of division and Unification, throughout
which it was influenced by some mix of capitalist and communist ideology. When the
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horrific atrocity that was WWII finally came to a close in 1945, Germany had seen a
near-complete destruction of its political, economic, and even cultural structures. The
rebuilding of these structures—in particular, the prison system—was a unique
opportunity for Germany to generate new ideologies surrounding crime and
incarceration, and to implemented new practices which reflected these ideologies. Prisons
played a significant role in the newly created Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the
West and German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East, and the development of these
institutions paralleled, in many ways, the developments of West and East Germany—and
of the Unified Germany in the past two decades. In this way, prisons in Germany today
are a product of a very short history. This is one reason why such a study is particularly
useful—its scope is manageable and traceable, and its development quite dramatic. Most
importantly, a study of Germany's prison system reveals the complex relationship
between capitalism, communism, incarceration, and gender.
The divergent paths of East and West Germany in the four decades following the
Second World War provide a fascinating case study in how two separate prison systems
can develop between two countries with a common language and culture and shared
history, which were divided for forty years, then expected quite suddenly to seamlessly
unify. Much like Franklin's discussion of regional discrepancies within the U.S. prison
system, this study analyzes the differences in incarceration policies and practices in East
and West Germany within the context of the dissimilar legacies of capitalism and
communism. Showing the influences of this divided history on Germany's contemporary
prison system, I argue that the extent to which Germany has become successfully unified

9
is reflected in this complex, yet generally efficacious blend of ideologies in its prison
system. Probing this connection between economic, political, and social institutions, my
study provides a history of German women's prisons in the country's divided, unifying,
and Unified eras. This project continuously demonstrates how German women's prisons
in East and West have developed through a series of social, economic, and political
changes occurring in each of the two states, changes that have influenced national
attitudes about incarceration as well as notions of femininity and womanhood.
I have chosen to focus my project specifically on women's prisons because I
believe incarcerated women in Germany and throughout the world to be a particularly
underserved population. “Like the societies that create them, (prisons) are largely
designed for and dominated by men,” making women an even further marginalized group
within the incarcerated population of both the U.S. and Germany (Colvin 2011, 10). Just
as prisons can tell us much about a country's social, political, and economic values,
women's prisons in particular often reveal social constructions of gender by providing
incongruences within the system; the oppression of women outside the prison space is
indicative of masculinist systems and values in society at large, but this oppression is
further intensified inside the prison.
Angela Davis1 writes that
Since the end of the eighteenth century, when
imprisonment began to emerge as the dominant form of
1

Davis' work is of particular interest, considering that she received her Bachelor's degree from the
West German University of Frankfurt in the mid 1960s and later her Ph.D. from the Humboldt University
in East Berlin in the late 1960s. Identifying as a socialist and a communist, her writing about the criminal
legal system focuses primarily on the American prison industrial complex, leaving us to wonder to what
extent her thinking and the formation of her activism was informed by her time spent in the divided
Germanys.
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punishment, convicted women have been represented as
essentially different from their male counterparts. It is true
that men who commit the kinds of transgressions that are
regarded as punishable by the state are labeled as social
deviants. Nevertheless, masculine criminality has always
been deemed more 'normal' than feminine criminality.
There has always been a tendency to regard those women
who have been publicly punished by the state for their
misbehaviors as significantly more aberrant and far more
threatening to society than their numerous male
counterparts. (Davis 2003, 65-6)
Davis also describes how women's prison reformists in England and the United
States in the nineteenth century focused on the prison becoming a space that would (and
should) reinforce women's traditional domestic roles by recreating a household situation
in which incarcerated women would learn cooking, cleaning, childrearing, and similar
female-assigned tasks in preparation for reintegration into society as proper female
subjects. In addition to perpetuating problematic gender norms, this model presumed a
certain class and race of its subjects, and did not account for the ways in which this
particular form of citizen-subject training was only possible for a certain race and class of
women (Davis 2003, 70-1). Often, the vision of a rehabilitative or resocializing prison is
that of one that prepares its subjects to conform to the outside society's race, class, and
gender roles and expectations upon release.
Furthermore, it is imperative to study incarcerated women because of their status
as a small minority in German prisons—making them significantly less recognized,
studied, attended to, and accommodated. This work hopes to add to the small but
dedicated current and historic study of these women in order to draw attention to their
unique needs and experiences.
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b. Theories of Morality and Punishment
In addition to the aforementioned works by Franklin and Davis, a number of other
theoretical frames have shaped my conception of incarceration and informed the rest of
this project. In order to analyze the various phases of the criminal justice system in
Germany, it is useful to begin with some key theoretical standpoints from which to
approach issues of crime, incarceration, gender, and morality. Recurring themes
throughout this project are those of retribution, resocialization, and rehabilitation; the
presence or absence of a care-based moral framework; the connection between the
economic and social order of a society and its approach to crime; and general, as well as
gender-specific, human rights, as defined the United Nations in the 1950s.
This study begins by questioning the driving forces behind crime and criminal
justice systems. Throughout these three chapters, I explore themes of resocialization,
rehabilitation, punishment, and deviance. In all cases, I favor a resocializing and
rehabilitating approach to incarceration, rather than one that penalizes and punishes its
subjects. This is very much tied to my belief that crime and deviance are socially
constructed and defined, and that individuals who commit punishable crimes—
particularly in a capitalist system— are generally those who have been already
marginalized, oppressed, and underserved. Thus, when I advocate for or praise certain
practices or policies, they tend to be those that promote healing rather than continued
suffering. An appropriate “equivalent to the treatment of a disease is the rehabilitation of
an offender, and it is a rehabilitative system, not a punishment system, that we ought to
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have if we are to respond, even to criminals, in anything like a decent, morally defensible
fashion” (Wasserstrom 1998, 57). In this sense, the primary goal is to restore the health
and functionality of the individual in a way that will most benefit society. It is therefore
difficult to envision some sort of rehabilitation that does not center around
resocialization; in other words, the ideal rehabilitated citizen is determined by the values
of the society in which she has been incarcerated. For this reason, rehabilitation and
resocialization take very different forms in Germany throughout time and region.
Additionally, I generally advocate for and seek out evidence of a care-based moral
framework in criminal legal systems, preferring practices and policies that promote and
support rather than hinder the social and familial relationships of incarcerated women.
Gilligan's empirical exploration of care-based versus justice-based moral reasoning is a
very useful tool in bringing about a specifically gendered analysis of laws, policies, and
practices surrounding criminality and incarceration. Gilligan explains how
with the shift in perspective from justice to care, the
organizing dimension of relationship changes from
inequality/equality to attachment/detachment, reorganizing
thoughts, feelings, and language so that words connoting
relationship like "dependence" or "responsibility" or even
moral terms such as "fairness" and "care" take on different
meanings. To organize relationships in terms of attachment
rather than in terms of equality changes the way human
connection is imagined, so that the images or metaphors of
relationship shift from hierarchy or balance to network or
web. (Gilligan 1987, 34)
Thus, within this framework, programs that allow mothers to care for their children
throughout their incarceration, or that allow or even encourage women to remain
connected to their support systems outside of the prison, are the most desirable within
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this frame of thinking and acting.
My inclination towards using Carol Gilligan's theories of a care-based moral
framework to gain additional insight into this project is further legitimized by the regular
occurrence of references to her in a large number of both primary and secondary texts
that I have examined. Her ideas seem to have struck a particular chord in the German
feminist consciousness—both in East and West. Perhaps this has something to do with
the relative, though obviously differing, fondness for socialism and social welfare in both
East and West German feminism. An ethics of care and holistic morality that values
relational decision-making is quite relevant in the context of the socialist feminist ideals,
though even the socialist East German state's style of paternalistic governance was far
from aligned with Gilligan's approach.
An understanding of the connections between economic systems and prisons is
also vital in order to understand the different reasons for and methods of incarceration
throughout the last sixty years in Germany. The very fact that the criminal legal systems
were fundamentally different in East and West Germany indicates the role of economic
ideology in constructing prisons. Marxist and socialist criminal and prison ideology
stands in contrast to western, capitalist ways of conceptualizing these cultural
phenomena. In the latter system, “criminal justice plays an ideological role in support of
capitalism because people do not recognize that the principles governing criminal justice
are reflections of capitalism. The principles of criminal justice appear instead to be the
result of pure reason, and thus a system that supports capitalism is (mistakenly) seen as
an expression of rationality itself” (Reiman 2003, 203). Rationality, as a supposed
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component of independent, individualistic moral reasoning, seems to be highly valued in
capitalist democracies, so it is no surprise that its influence would be extended to the
prison system.
In contrast to this emphasis on rationality and individualism is a valuation of
relationality, a dichotomy explored by Gilligan. Relationality sees humans as innately
interdependent, and considers social and familial relationships to be central to humanity.
Marxist and socialist ideologies concerning crime seem to favor such interdependence,
though in reality, this promotion of relationality may not always be fully reflected in
communist prison systems. These ideologies see such deviant behavior as inherently at
odds with a socialist system; crime is thus dealt with not as a natural or inevitable
element of society, but as a residual effect of capitalism that, through reeducation and
resocialization as a proper socialist citizen, will eventually become obsolete (Reiman
2003, 204). The role of prisons in a communist state, one might argue, would be
theoretically impermanent, and would therefore operate under a very different framework
than those in a capitalist system, in which prisons would always be necessary to serve as
warehouses for the poorest and most underserved and disadvantaged by society.
Finally, I consider various standards of human rights within prisons in order to lay
a basic foundation for how individuals should be treated within prisons. This study
repeatedly examines how these standards have been broken or upheld. It is important to
note that these standards are also subject to the values of the governing body that created
them; still, it is contextually useful to include the United Nations' guidelines in order to
assess the human rights failures and successes within German prisons from the 1950s
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until today.
Developed and implemented in 1955, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners provides an insight into what were commonly held to be
appropriate and “humane” guidelines for the treatment of incarcerated persons.
Additionally, this set of rules, which were not enforced, and clearly not always followed,
go beyond the work of a theoretical framework, in that they were, in theory, universal
guidelines for incarceration practices during the time of division in Germany, and
continued to be regarded as standards of human rights within prisons today. Examples of
these guidelines include stipulations that men and women be housed in separate
institutions; that no male staff members enter a women's prison unless a female officer is
present; that separation from the outside world is in and of itself a punishment, and
should be mitigated whenever possible; that “the regime of the institution should seek to
minimize any differences between prison life and life at liberty that tend to lessen the
responsibility of the prisoners or the respect due to their dignity as human beings;” and
that reintegration should be a primary goal of incarceration (United Nations 1995). These
standards are hardly radical, yet their implementation has proven to be elusive in many
prison systems throughout the world. The issue of human rights is central to an analysis
of prisons—in Germany and beyond, and the treatment of incarcerated people is therefore
central to the humanity and democracy of any state.

II. Structure and Organization
This thesis consists of three chapters, structured chronologically:
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The first chapter, “Divided Germany, Divergent Ideologies, 1945-1989,” describes
the differences in ideologies and practices of crime and incarceration in the divided
Germany after the end of the Second World War. East Germany, a communist system,
demonstrated a much different criminal justice and prison system than West Germany, its
capitalist neighbor. This first chapter also carefully examines differences in women's
idealized and actual roles in and relationships to the state in the two divided Germanys,
and argues that these differences contribute to many of the differences seen in the
incarceration of women in East and West Germany. The discrepancies between
incarceration practices and policies in the GDR and FRG can be accounted for only
through an analysis of ideologies of crime and punishment as well as of ideologies of
gender and womanhood. While resocialization and rehabilitation practices in the two
countries served to reshape 'deviant' women into proper models of citizenship and
womanhood in a communist and capitalist state, respectively, these models did not fully
account for many of the realities of women's lives outside of prison.
The second chapter, “De-centralization of Power and its Discontents in the New
Capitalist State, 1989-1995,” explores changes in the prison systems during the years
surrounding Germany Unification, focusing on the impact of the supposed
decentralization and democratization of power in the East German states on women and
incarcerated people. Owing to the general dearth of information regarding changes made
specifically to women's prisons in Germany throughout this historical moment, the task
of this chapter is to bridge the gap between the pre-Unification years and the
contemporary state of Germany's women's prisons. To this end, the chapter provides a
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thorough exploration of the developments in women's involvement in political and social
movements, as well as of their shifting roles in the newly expanded capitalist Germany.
Additionally, it looks at the reforms and changes to the prisons in both East and West
Germany during these years, reforms that were neither uniformly implemented nor
consistently beneficial. The tracking of these changes for women and for incarcerated
people, whom I argue throughout this chapter to be the most disenfranchised and
disadvantaged by Unification, illuminates the ways in which their altered positionality
within the German economic, social, and political State leads to the current state of
women's incarceration in Germany.
The third chapter, “Gender, Criminality, and Social Welfare in Contemporary
Germany, 1995-2012,” brings this project up to the contemporary moment, exposing the
current state of women's prisons, incarceration, and penal ideology in Germany, and
connecting these trends with the political, economic, and social climate in the country
today. Germany is now arguably the strongest economy in the European Union, propping
up the failing economies of many of its fellow EU states, and is in many ways a great
success story in its dramatic recovery in the sixty seven years since the end of WWII.
But, as I argue in this chapter, it is important to look at the plight of incarcerated women,
as an underprivileged group within the country, in order to understand the remaining
weaknesses of such a state, and to see how the efforts that the state is making to better
serve this population are indicative of its strength as a democratic nation. This chapter
also explores the extent to which incarceration ideology now reflects the country's
socially, politically, and economically divided past: do we still see hints of communist or
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socialist thinking in criminal legal policies and practices? And finally, do the primary
goals of incarceration in Germany—resocialization and rehabilitation—perhaps raises the
question: is any form of punitive incarceration still relevant?
The conclusion of this study presents some final observations about the
connections between Germany's post-WWII history and its prisons, and asks what the
future of incarceration in Germany will be, given the current trends in the country's
social, political, and economic developments.
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Chapter One: Divided Germany, Divergent Ideologies, 1945-1989

I. Introduction
“The official West and East German pronouncements viewed the other's ideal women as
victims. The Soviets and East Germans saw in the West German women little more than slaves to
consumerism; the Westerners saw in their Eastern counterparts little more than unfree working
'Muttis' (Mommies). In both cases a powerful picture laden with historical significance was
transported across the borders. By constructing pictures of women in one country as housewives
and consumers, and in the other as 'being as good as men,' the roles of woman, mother, and
worker were used on both sides for ideological legitimation, that is, to justify the different
developments of the two postwar German political and social orders” (Young 1999, 44).

At the end of the Second World War, Germany was conquered and divided by the
four Allied Powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. By
1949, two separate German states had been formed: the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) in the West, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East1. The former
was under the control of the western three Powers: the United States, Great Britain, and
France, and was established economically and politically as a capitalist state. The latter,
meanwhile, was founded by the Soviet Union and subsequently became a communist
nation. With the creation of these two states came the development of two very different
state ideologies, affecting nearly every facet of the government and people; significant in
this bifurcation was the development of two approaches to criminal justice and of two
different gender ideologies.
This chapter analyzes the ways in which the criminal justice and prison systems in
former East and West Germany in the years between 1949 and 1990 were informed by

1

Note: I will be using the terms West Germany/Federal Republic of Germany/FRG, as well as East
Germany/German Democratic Republic/GDR interchangeably throughout this chapter.
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state ideologies of crime and punishment, looking particularly at how practices of
incarcerating women reflected each state's envisioned expectations and idealized roles of
women. This serves the argument of the thesis as a whole by clearly demarcating the
differences in women's incarceration practices in East and West Germany based on their
differing social, political, and economic placement. Additionally, it serves as a foundation
for later chapters as they explore the development of such practices as these two German
states underwent the lengthy process of Unification.
In this chapter, I argue that the treatment of women in East and West German
prisons was reflective of the roles expected of these women outside of the prison, that the
resocialization process necessarily indicates a certain model of ideal citizenship, and that
the policies and programs in women's prison systems in East and West Germany were
therefore reflective of communist and capitalist ideologies of femininity and
womanhood—but not always of the realities of the lives and needs of actual German
women. Because the state placed value in the reintegration of incarcerated women into
society, it logically had a vested interest in the type of woman to be “produced” in the
prisons. Taking into consideration the fact that both countries were to some extent
organized patriarchally, and that the female subject to be reproduced in both prison
systems was one of a marginalized citizen outside of the prison, it is important to
understand how such oppression was differently expressed in East and West Germany.
One way to differentiate these two manifestations of patriarchy is by defining East
German patriarchy as “public” and West German patriarchy as “private”. This divergence
can be seen in the primary power relationships that women experienced, with the State
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and within their families:
Overall, the nature of the state's role in public patriarchy
was to emphasize the direct relationship of mothers to the
state; the nature of the state's role in private patriarchy was
to encourage wives' dependence on husbands and children's
on parents. In turn, this means that in public patriarchy
women experienced their oppression as mothers and as
more directly connected to the activities of the state as
patriarch; in private patriarchy, women experienced their
oppression as wives and as more directly connected to their
individual dependence on their spouses. (Ferree 1995, 1213)
This is an important contrast to make in the course of this discussion of women's
prisons in the FRG and GDR, as this public/private distinction was reflected in the
patriarchal policies and practices of German women's prisons. While any binary,
including this one, can be problematic if conceptualized too simplistically, understanding
the ways in which these two forms of patriarchy influenced policies and programs in the
German prisons is nevertheless quite useful. Both East and West German prisons
practiced public patriarchy in the most basic sense: both became the primary paternalistic
oppressor of incarcerated women, and made sure that these women's most direct
relationship was with the state. Yet the programming inside reveals this broader
distinction between private and public: while East German prisons attempted to reform
women's subservience to the state, West German prisons aimed to retrain women to be
proper domestic wives to their husbands.
Women's criminality in both states was considered deviant, but for different
reasons: in the West, because the ideal German woman was thought of as a domestic,
feminine housewife, and in the East, because all criminal behavior was inherently at odds
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with communist ideology. The East and West German models of womanhood that the
prisons put forth were, however, out of touch with the reality of women's lives outside of
the prisons. In East Germany, the model of the ideal female socialist subject inside the
prison ignored the significant role that motherhood played in the lives of many women.
This model, in its apparent gender neutrality, disregarded the importance of many
women's relationships with and care-taking responsibilities toward their children. In West
Germany, meanwhile, the model of domesticity into which the prisons tried to mold their
female inhabitants was one that was becoming increasingly challenged and outdated
outside of the prisons, and that served to limit the occupational choices of these women
upon release. These expectations of womanhood, and the extent to which they conflicted
with the reality of women's lives and created barriers to women's empowerment and
equality were articulated by feminists of the time. In addition to exposing the
constructions of femininity present in the two states, the work of such feminists points to
the complex relationships of East and West German women with their respective states—
relationships that were manifested inside the criminal justice and prison systems just as
they were outside of them.
Additionally, while both systems displayed traits of favoring a generally
rehabilitative and resocializing approach in their criminal justice and prison systems, the
actual conditions that resulted from the implementation of these policies lacked, to a large
extent, a care-based approach to criminal justice. Often times they disregarded even basic
human rights. There is no clear demarcation of good and evil between East and West
Germany, nor was this unambiguous distinction present in the prison systems. Rather,
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both systems were complex and often contradictory, and were in many ways indicative of
the most failed aspects of communist and capitalist systems. Socialist feminist analyses
of crime and punishment have been generally reluctant to critically examine actual
examples of socialist states, and in particular their criminal legal systems (Schleef 1996,
222). It is important, however, to acknowledge the complications and contradictions of
such a system, and to analyze the extent to which two corresponding states—one
capitalist, one communist—viewed crime and punishment according to their own varying
ideologies. As Debra Schleef notes, “there is much to be learned by studying the East
German attempt to create a more relational and less adversarial legal system” (Schleef
1996, 222). The East German system is best viewed in a comparison with the West
German system—two very different legal and economic systems formed by and
supposedly for two arbitrarily split halves of a common culture of people. Likewise, it is
useful to dismantle certain elements of the capitalist West German criminal and prison
systems, as it contained similar tensions and inconsistencies as in the East.

a. Method and Structure
This chapter begins with an overview of incarceration ideologies and practices in
the two German states, compiled through secondary source material as well as directly
from laws and policies of the time. It shows first the ways in which both systems
demonstrated elements of rehabilitative and resocializing ideology, then analyzes the
places where this ideology fell short or became complicated. Next, the chapter explores
the relationships of East and West German women to the state, as illuminated by the
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feminist discourse and activism of the time. It then continues into a discussion of the
treatment of incarcerated women in the two Germanys.
In order to view the experiences of incarcerated German women in the context of
the lives of German women outside of prison, this chapter draws heavily from Frauen im
Gefängnis (“Women in Prison”), a collection of writings from incarcerated women and
women whose work brought them into close contact with the prison system in West
Germany in the late 1970s. It also utilizes information from and about the feminist
movement of the time to expose many of the nuanced realities and expectations facing
women outside of the prison system in the FRG in order to better connect these
experiences inside and outside the prisons.
Unfortunately, prisons were a taboo topic in the GDR (Arnold 1995, 81). This is
not to say that no one was writing about them at the time, but it meant that GDR prison
writing was not published prior to Unification. Thus, there was no East German
equivalent to Frauen im Gefängnis from which to draw perfect parallels between the
GDR and FRG penal systems. In order to paint as accurate a picture as possible of the
prison system in the GDR, the chapter looks at the East German Penal Code, and engages
with scholarship, both of the time (from West Germany or other non-Soviet countries) as
well as with contemporary sources.

II. General Ideologies of and Approaches to Crime and Incarceration
The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners states that
the purpose and justification of a sentence of imprisonment
or a similar measure of deprivation of liberty is ultimately
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to protect society against crime. This end can only be
achieved if the period of imprisonment is used to ensure,
so far as possible, that upon his return to society the
offender is not only willing but able to lead a law-abiding
and self-supporting life. (United Nations 1955, 13)
The extent to which one receives therapy, resocialization, and work training is
thus assumed to need not be any more liberatory than the role in society into which the
incarcerated person has been positioned based on their gender, race, class, sexuality,
religion, nationality, etc. German prisons, in their attempts to create proper capitalist and
communist citizens, handled incarcerated women in ways that aimed to create more
desirable female citizen-subjects.
It is prudent to begin with an examination of the ways in which criminal justice
and prison policies reflected state ideology in the two German states: looking first at the
ways in which both governments seemed to intend to rehabilitate and resocialize their
citizens through care-based and relational policies, and second at the ways in which each
system failed to do so, often failing even to fulfill the basic physical and emotional needs
of their incarcerated citizens. Individual rehabilitation was limited by the lack of attention
to the specific needs of incarcerated women, while collective resocialization was
hampered by the prison systems' resistance to helping create women who would be
empowered to face the realities of their lives outside of prison.

a. Federal Republic of Germany
1. Rehabilitation and Resocialization
The West German Penal Code was developed with the creation of the FRG and
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dramatically overhauled in 1969, and in 1977, the first German Prison Act was
implemented (Boetticher and Feest 2008, 367). The prison system reforms that took place
in 1969 were “intended to strengthen the preventative purposes of punishment as opposed
to its purely retributive aspects, and in this way to reduce the significance of
imprisonment, in particular, as a form of punishment” (Dünkel 1995, 288). The Prison
Act of 1977 ensured that “the legal status of prisoners was regulated by statute for the
first time in West German history, thereby creating opportunities for executing prison
sentences in a liberal manner and for improving the living conditions of prisoners”
(Dünkel 1995, 302). It also declared that reintegration was to be the primary objective for
prison administrators to pursue (Boetticher and Feest 2008, 367). Shorter sentences and
the abolishment of the death penalty in 1949 under the Basic Law exemplified this move
toward somewhat less punitive measures (Dünkel 1995, 288-9). The reasoning for the
abolishment of the death penalty was its obvious preclusion of any possibility for
rehabilitation or resocialization; thus, even in cases of a life sentence, the court had to
guarantee that the time spent in prison would include provisions for rehabilitation and
resocialization, and that in all but the most “heinous” cases (including multiple murders
and Nazi-affiliated crimes), the individual had the chance to be paroled after fifteen years
(Dünkel 1995, 289).
As a result of the major changes made in 1969, only 6% of sentencing resulted in
unconditional prison terms; fines or probation were ordered for the remainder of
sentences (Dünkel 1995, 289). This resistance to mass incarceration seems to indicate
concern for the perpetrator's social and relational well-being—though political and
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economic factors likely also played a role in the changes. According to the Penal Code of
the time, which is still in use in contemporary Germany, the system intended to utilize, to
a certain extent, rehabilitative and care-based restorative means of justice. Examples of
this, in addition to the extensive alternatives to incarceration, included the following
provisions: first, the amount of reparations that a perpetrator was fined—and this was by
far the most often used punishment—was based in large part on a consideration of their
own assets and/or income. Second, the sentencing procedure took into consideration the
circumstances of the perpetrator's life leading up to, at the time of, and since the criminal
act. Third, there were three main forms of incarceration: traditional prison time,
psychiatric hospitalization, and detoxification treatment, and individuals were assigned to
one or more based on their own needs (Federal Republic of Germany, 1976). By the
1970s, West German prisons also provided mandatory opportunities for education and
work training, programs designed to enable better reintegration upon release (Dünkel
1995, 288).
The reforms of 1969 also emphasized the use of short prison sentences (those that
lasted six months or less) as an alternative measure for those who seemed less likely to
respond to a fine. These incarceration measures were intended to be employed in the
place of a fine “only if the offender's personality or the special circumstances of the
offense required such a sanction in order to influence the offender or to defend the legal
order” (Dünkel 1995, 288). Like with many other provisions of the reform measures, the
reasoning for the short prison systems was not retribution, but rather to prevent future
criminal acts in each individual case. Additionally, fines and other “non-custodial”
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sentences remained overwhelmingly the predominant avenue of the courts (Dünkel 1995,
288).

2. Critiques of Implementation
The extent to which the FRG's policies successfully cared for and rehabilitated its
citizens, however, is debatable. The Prison Act was “flawed from the beginning by the
fact that some of its finance effective provisions (higher wages and social security for
prisoners) were not immediately put into force. They were postponed to a later
parliamentary decision, which, however, never came about” (Boetticher and Feest 2008,
367). Frieder Dünkel points out that
in many respects the Prison Act offers only an unsatisfactory
compromise solution. In particular, the scope for discretion
is too extensive and provisions are often vague, for
example, about what is regarded as 'treatment'. (Dünkel
1995, 302)
Unfortunately, the implementation of shorter prison sentences, while seemingly
preferable to longer sentences, and in many cases also to fines, had its own issues.
Shorter sentences facilitated a lack of services inside—indeed, it was difficult to
implement effective programming when the turnover rate of incarcerated individuals was
so high—and though “it is quite possible to improve short-term imprisonment by giving
it a treatment orientation,” this change was slow and unevenly put into effect (Dünkel
1995, 292).

b. German Democratic Republic
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1. Rehabilitation and Resocialization
East German criminal law looked much different from its West German
counterpart. It was predominantly guided by Marxist and socialist ideas of the state, of
citizens' roles within and in relation to said state, and of crime at a theoretical level. The
general principles of Marxist and socialist ideology concerning crime saw it as inherently
at odds with a socialist system; criminal acts were therefore dealt with not as somewhat
natural or inevitable elements of society, but as residual effects of capitalism. Hans
Joachim Schneider argues that East German criminology was “an instrument of
propaganda; it was bound to protect the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party.
The belief was that the nationalization of the means of production would invariably
produce a new type of man, a 'socialist personality' who would not commit any offenses”
(Schneider 1991, 286). Following this line of thinking, crime would have eventually
become obsolete through the reeducation and resocialization of perpetrators as better
socialists.
This philosophy meant, however, that East Germans who committed crimes (all
criminal acts were included in this—from theft to murder—and not just reportedly antiCommunist political organizing) were considered, to varying degrees, to be enemies of
the state (Ziegler 1998, 1). To commit crime in the GDR, according to this theory, meant
that one was either still operating under the influences of lingering traces of western,
capitalist thinking, or that one was simply an aberrant socialist citizen. As a result,
criminal acts were considered personal (and anti-social) problems, since the opinion
prevailed that societal problems would disappear with the development of socialism.
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“The message of socialist law,” writes Debra Schleef, “is one of discipline and education
in proper socialist behavior” (Schleef 1996, 224). To this end, the emphasis was not on
the rights of individual citizens, but on their needs—individually as well as collectively
(Schleef 1996, 230). While a Marxist theory of crime does not fully account for all
incarceration trends that actually occurred in the GDR, this ideology nevertheless
permeated the criminal legal and prison systems (Sander 1979, 11).
Control of the East German prison system was passed from the Justice
Department to the Department of the Interior in 1950, a move that facilitated the
synthesizing of criminal and penal laws with the security of the state (Arnold 1995, 88).
Accordingly, the GDR's Penal Code heavily emphasized the protection of the socialist
state, and its interests were always put before the interests of individual citizens: “The
socialist State,” reads the Code, “protects its state, economic, and military secrets above
all else” (German Democratic Republic 1974). This is not to say, however, that this
system was inherently more harsh or retributive than its capitalist neighbor; in fact, it
drew upon socialist theories of incarceration that emphasized the care-based nature of
community and the inherent importance of social relationality (Schleef 1996, 223).
Incarceration was described in the Code as being by far the harshest of criminal
punishments, and in all but the most serious cases, the courts did not turn to incarceration
(German Democratic Republic 1974). Additionally, it emphasized that “the dignity of
humans, their freedom and rights, are protected by the Criminal Law of the socialist
State,” a proclamation which theoretically safeguards citizens' rights (German
Democratic Republic 1974).
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The official statistics kept by the GDR government show a sharp decrease in
crime rates throughout the early years of the developing East German socialist state, from
2,536 criminal acts per 100,000 inhabitants in the period between 1946 and 1949 to 715
in 1984 (Sagel-Grande 1987, 92). Additionally, crime rates in East Germany were much
lower before Unification than they have been since: according to government reports
from both countries, the crime rate in the FRG was 10 times that in the GDR—though
this low East German rate was likely a manipulated figure “for propaganda reasons” and
did not include political prisoners (Schneider 1991, 287). Schneider, who has a clear West
German bias, believes that the following are more likely excuses for the low crime rate in
the GDR than the theory of a socialist extinguishment of such behavior: small urban
populations, less “social mobility” and travel, a homogenous population and fewer
“foreigners,” more incorporation of youth into society, and a lower gross national
income, which meant that there were simply fewer goods to steal (Schneider 1991, 288).
There was also widespread decriminalization of many minor offenses, in which they were
removed from the official penal code, but were nevertheless still subject to state penalties
(Sagel-Grande 1987, 92). While these may be valid points to make, it should be noted
that many of these factors are considered in the socialist model of citizenship and crime
to be reasons why such crime rates would be lower in a socialist country—particularly
the incorporation of youth into society and the relatively minor amount of consumerism.
Additionally, a key reason for the low crime rates was the existence and prevalence of
social courts—a somewhat informal system that allowed citizens to work out grievances
amongst themselves without being involved in the traditional court system (Schleef 1996,
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228).
One primary component of socialist reeducation was to firmly incorporate
incarcerated individuals into the collective labor force. “Every prisoner in the GDR had
the right to work,” writes Jorg Arnold, though the line between “right” and enforced duty
was likely rather nebulous (Arnold 1995, 85). While the rights of laborers included in the
FRG's Prison Act were never put into effect, in the GDR,
this right to work was not only enshrined in the Prison Act
but also occurred in practice. It meant paid work with all
the normal social security benefits. In terms of social
insurance, prisoners were placed on an equal footing with
workers outside prisons. The wages of workers were not
the same as those of workers outside: they amounted to
only 18 percent of the take-home pay a normal worker
would get for performing the same task. This was,
however, above the international average for prison work
and this was recognized and appreciated, at least after the
turning point. (Arnold 1995, 85)
The relatively high wages for workers incarcerated in East Germany is particularly
notable, and seems in line with the mission of East German prisons to engage
incarcerated persons in “useful labor,” which presumably would have had some sort of
effect on their ability to work outside as well, particularly since the Reintegration Act
required that prisoners be guaranteed reentry into the workforce after release, preferably
in the same industry in which they had worked prior to their incarceration (Ziegler 1998,
3). In addition to provisions for labor reintegration after a period of incarceration, the
Reintegration Act stipulated that local governments had to provide housing for people
who were recently released from prison (Ziegler 1998, 3).
Though the policies were seemingly very progressive, the realities of their

33
implementation, as Arnold explains, were far less than perfect (Arnold 1995, 86). The
right to work, for example, was through no coincidence an extremely important resource
for the state, and such programs inside the prisons
must be seen in the context of the state's economic
planning, of which the prisoners' work was a necessary part
and an indispensable source of state revenue. But it should
not be overlooked that it was a positive feature of the GDR
to guarantee work for every citizen and to realize this goal
within the prison system. (Arnold 1995, 85)
In this way, a socialist approach to incarceration seems to have been implemented in the
GDR's prisons insofar as the ultimate goal was to reintegrate citizens by creating an
environment within the prisons that recreated—at least in some senses—the world
outside.
2. Critiques of Implementation
East Germany was known to have been a police state that extensively violated
human rights, particularly those of political prisoners (Glees 1998, 173). Prisons in the
GDR, which disregarded many of the UN's human rights guidelines for prisoners, were
ideologically impermanent, and therefore operated under a very different framework than
those in West Germany, which were serving the need that prisons in capitalist societies
often do: that of a catch-all for the poorest and most underserved and disadvantaged by
society (Sagel-Grande 1987, 91). It was perhaps this very idea of impermanence that
helped to bring about the harsh and inhumane physical and psychological conditions in
East German prisons. Additionally, the authoritarian nature of the GDR government left
little room for citizen recourse; prisoners could not have the courts review complaints
that they had about their treatment or about decisions made against them. Their only
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option was to send reports to the administration of the prison itself, a fruitless and
potentially dangerous action (Arnold 1995, 84).
Arnold contemplates the inconsistencies within the GDR, writing that
we have to raise the question why the ideals of humanistic
relations between individual, society, and state, which were
announced at the inauguration of the GDR, were not
applied to the prison system. Were they seen as
inapplicable from the start or were they abused and
betrayed only in actual practice? (Arnold 1995, 88)
This is an essential question in attempting to separate the ideological from the
actual; perhaps incarcerated citizens were seen as so deviant from the expectations of
communist citizenship that they were no longer afforded the same rights as those outside.
Certainly, the conditions of the prisons themselves were dismal by anyone's standards,
and this was acknowledged by international organizations and institutions. Prisons in the
GDR “were not in accordance with the Standard Minimum Rules of the United Nations.
This assertion refers to both the normative capacity and to the design of, for example, the
sanitary installations, of the prison cells, but also to severe shortcomings with respect to
the medical care of prisoners” (Arnold 1995, 85). The Council of Europe released an
official statement in 1986 condemning the incarceration practices of East German
prisons. They cited the following as being human rights violations present in GDR
prisons:
a. conditions of imprisonment, which are tantamount to
physical or mental torture, such as deprivation of sleep or
the threat of reprisals against families; b. hard labour,
which is both unreasonable and detrimental to health; c.
medical treatment, which is wholly insufficient and which
often results in permanent damage to health; d. insufficient
diet; e. refusal to allow a proper legal defense, and failure
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to communicate legal texts and the charges in due form
until shortly before the trial; f. the separation of mothers
from infants born in prison, as well as the separation of
parents from their children for political reasons; g.
inhuman overcrowding of prisoners in cells which are too
small. (Parliamentary Assembly 1986)

While horrendous, these conditions were not unique to East German prisons, but
the capitalist western world was quick to singularly condemn incarceration practices in
the GDR. Thomas Ziegler describes the GDR prison system as having been under strict
military rule. The top priority of such a system, he argues, was security. Just as the
sanctity of the socialist East German state was in many ways compromised by the
presence of harsh governance, so, too, were many of the aims of a resocializing prison
system obstructed by its austere security measures (Ziegler 1998). The conditions
described by the Council of Europe were symptomatic of this inconsistency, revealing the
extreme discrepancy between socialist ideology and its implementation.
Though the GDR's ostensible goal seems to have been to reeducate (or retrain)
incarcerated individuals as appropriate communist citizens, this seems to have been
mostly ineffective. The education and training that took place within East German prisons
“was to a large extent also ideological education.... measures of ideological training (e.g.
participation in relevant lectures, discussion, etc.) were obligatory for all prisoners.” The
guiding belief behind such programs was that proper socialist citizens—male and
female—would commit no further offenses (Arnold 1995, 84). Ultimately, the efficacy of
the GDR's system seems rather grim when viewed in light of East German recidivism
rates, which rose from 18 percent in 1970 to 35 percent in 1985, a very telling marker of
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how well the goals of rehabilitation and resocialization were truly accomplished within
the prison system (Arnold 1995, 87). While lowered crime rates overall showed elements
of a successful socialist state, the raised recidivism rates demonstrate how the prison
system seems to have lagged behind other sectors of East German state and society in
synthesizing socialist ideology and reality.

III. Women and Feminism in the Two States
The distinction between a capitalist and a communist system can tell us much
about how the approaches to criminal justice and criminality differed between the GDR
and the FRG, but it does not tell the whole story. As criminologist Jeffrey Reiman
explains, communist and capitalist theories of crime are unable to account for everything
that occurred at the time. Though the ideological differences between two such systems
are quite clear, “actual criminal justice systems will be approximations of this tendency.
Actual criminal justice systems will also clearly be shaped by human actions—often
substantially so” (Reiman 2003, 204). Reiman's explanation serves to support the
argument, offered often as an explanation for the continued presence of crime in the
GDR, that residual capitalist values in East Germany were largely, if not wholly,
responsible for the supposedly unsocialist criminal behavior that was still occurring.
Additionally, this line of thinking helps explain why socialism was unable to completely
eradicate patriarchy.
Despite these discrepancies between ideology and reality, there are clear
differences in the ways in which incarcerated persons, particularly incarcerated women,
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were viewed and treated in East and West Germany. These differences can essentially be
traced back to the (admittedly complicated and imperfect) capitalist/communist
distinction, largely based on the extent to which the roles and expectations of women in
the two systems differed. Examining feminism and feminist activism that was occurring
in the two states exposes not only the expectations that each state had of women and the
roles that each imposed on them—which was further reflected in the programs and
policies affecting the resocialization of incarcerated women—but also the true realities of
women's lives, realities which were not always adequately addressed within the prisons.
Additionally, an analysis of feminism in the divided Germanys illuminates the
relationships that existed between East and West German women and their respective
states. These positionalities, exemplified by the avenues and attitudes toward
womanhood, activism, and the state taken by feminists in each country, help inform the
relationship of incarcerated women to the two states. Here, we begin to see this
distinction between public and private patriarchy, and its widespread implications.

a. Federal Republic of Germany
The issues facing West German women were the outcome of the patriarchal needs
of a capitalist state, much as those facing East German women were influenced by a
somewhat patriarchal socialist approach to labor participation “equality”. West German
women, unlike their East German counterparts, struggled to be accepted, treated as
equals, and compensated fairly in the workforce, causing the right to work to become an
issue of primary concern to West German women. Women in the FRG were expected
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primarily to be wives and mothers, and their role in the capitalist labor market was mostly
unpaid and in the home (Cooke 2006, 136). Though the Basic Law in West Germany
officially decreed gender equality, it was “a proclamation without much content.
Lawmakers saw in this clause no special obligation to realize the equality of women”
(Young 1999, 46). This de facto lack of access to financially compensated labor, and
therefore to economic resources, was the impetus for much of the feminist movement in
the West.
The West German women's movement was divided into two main factions: the
autonomous and the institutional feminists. The autonomous feminists envisioned
breaking away from the system, while institutional feminists intended to work within it
(Young 1999, 27). The
inability to gain access to the party and state structures not
only 'forced' social movements into working outside
traditional party channels; the less egalitarian and highly
bureaucratic political culture also gave rise to a more
radical, noncompromising feminist movement. The
militancy of the German autonomous movement can be
seen both in its 'anti-organizational ideology' and in its
anticonventional 'action repertoire'. (Young 1999, 52)
This antipathy towards the state and government structures, and the relative
freedom that West German women had to challenge such institutions seems to have
created an environment in which criticizing the criminal legal and prison systems was
expected. The West German prison system, then, was invested in retraining the women
inside to be docile, domestic, and subservient to their husbands; whether this was in
response to the feminist movement on the outside is unclear, but it certainly shows the
importance of this sort of idealized femininity to the state. Women outside the prison
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system were struggling against the passive roles given to them, and none broke away
from this idealized image of womanhood more than the women who had committed
crimes; thus, the state's aim was to bring incarcerated women back into the fold of a
lifestyle that was being widely resisted on the outside.

b. German Democratic Republic
Expressions of women's discontent in East Germany looked much different than
in West Germany. Women activists, writers, and intellectuals did not consider themselves
to be feminists—to them, the term referred to a set of bourgeois values and actions2.
Accordingly, a vocal women's movement did not crop up in the GDR until the late 1980s,
and was more reformist than revolutionary, unlike its West German feminist counterpart
(Young 1999, 29).
Women in the GDR were expected to be workers or working mothers, but had a
relatively high level of economic independence, due in large part to provisions in the
GDR's constitution that allowed for year-long maternity leave, family allowances, and
monetary compensation for childbearing women (Kranz 2005, 74). Though there were
considerable progressive policies in place allowing them to be supported in and in control
of their reproductive labor, women's emancipation was in the form of rights that the
paternalistic state handed down to them, rather than what was articulated by the women
themselves. East Germany's socialist ideologies of supposed gender equality “left no

2

Though East German women activists, writers, and thinkers were not using the term feminist and
feminism, I will continue to refer to them and their movement in such terms, since their anti-sexist
thinking and action would be considered feminist by most standards, and because they themselves
eventually did come to embrace the terms.

40
independent action for women themselves in constructing their own identity.
Emancipation was decreed 'from above.' The ideological commitment to solving the
women's question from above was to some extent also born out of necessity [of
rebuilding the labor force after WWII]” (Young 1999, 63). Though many of the freedoms
and rights granted to women in the GDR were directed towards them as mothers, other
rights, such as affordable and accessible abortions, gave women a great degree of control
over their bodies; their role in the socialist state was not entirely that of a mother, but
rather primarily of a socialist worker and citizen (Kranz 2005, 75).
Feminist activism in the GDR had to remain within the rubric of socialism and
communism, just as all forms of activism did. Feminist writers of the time “tended to
complement rather than criticize public policies on women” (Martens 2001, 29). That is
not to say, however, that it was state control that forced women writers and activists to
think only within the framework of socialism; since Unification, a large number of East
German women and feminists have remained committed to many of the ideals and
benefits afforded to women and to society in general under a socialist system (Funk
1994).
When GDR General Secretary Erich Hoenicker declared the 'women's problem' to
be solved, this meant that the role of women in the GDR was still rigidly defined by the
state, though it was a working role that sharply contrasted to that of women in the FRG.
So-called Mutti-Politik (“Mommy-Policy”) consisted of policies designed to better enable
women to balance work and domestic labor (Kranz 2005, 73). It was found, however, that
this double role—that of worker and mother— was expected only of East Germany
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women (as opposed to being shared by East German men). As this double standard
became increasingly clear, women “realized that their understanding of 'emancipation'
was different from the views of their political leaders” and began to articulate their
discontents (Kranz 2005, 73).
In East Germany, socialist feminists, though they appreciated the governmentsanctioned benefits they had, resisted the government's assertion that gender equality had
been reached, and wished to be able to define their own needs. East German feminist
writers, “having had no fear that women would lose their legal equality and their right to
work, focused precisely on the contradictions that full employment created in the lives of
women. Believing women to be equally productive members of society, they thought they
were entitled to corresponding personal fulfillment” (Martens 2001, 20). Though the
patriarchal role of the state gave women only the rights and equality that benefited the
communist system, women were not eager to throw such rights out the window—rather,
they wished to break down some of the inconsistencies resulting from the still-existing
patriarchy.
Lorna Martens argues that feminist writers in the GDR began to write about topics
only after they were legal or state-sanctioned, so that the critiques of certain elements of
East German society were still somewhat aligned with the interests of the state. She
discusses how women's literature in the GDR often worked to make certain “women's
topics” issues that could be written about and discussed, and describes how this process
occurred discursively at times, “but more often it is made performatively: speaking out
about these topics itself breaks down the barriers against speaking about them. The
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boundaries of what can and should be talked about are expanded most effectively by the
sheer force of repetition, by critical mass” (Martens 2001, 33). This process happened
slowly, and ideas could not be suddenly thrust into the public consciousness. Rather,
issues had to be introduced in ways that inconspicuously made them part of the
established socialist-sanctioned discourse. In this way, stories “collected around topics
that had been not so much controversial as invisible” (Martens 2001, 33). The taboo
nature of prisons and incarceration in East German discourse kept it from being publicly
discussed in East German women's circles, but the GDR women writers' and activists'
focus on the role of women in peace-making activity could have been applied to a
criticism of penalizing practices in the criminal justice system—not from a standpoint of
breaking away from socialism entirely, but of reforming it.

IV. Women in Prison
a. Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany had a small but passionate contingent of
feminist criminologists and activists who were concerned with the growing population of
women who were incarcerated in West German prisons. Marlis Dürkop was among them;
she was critical of the oppression of the prison system, particularly as it did not take into
account the needs of women and as it demonstrated practices that further marginalized
and disempowered them.
In order to examine more closely women's incarceration practices in the FRG, it is
useful to look specifically at the collection of narratives, reports, and policy
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recommendations on the incarceration of women in the FRG contained in Marlis
Dürkop's 1978 Frauen im Gefängnis (“Women in Prison”). The book was meant to
incorporate both theory and praxis, to be scholarly but also a tool for activism. Dürkop
explains in the introduction how “we were of differing opinions about whether or not this
should be a 'scientific' book. We believe that theory and practice are inseparable”
(Dürkop 1978, 15). This book, then, was to be a collection of entries that would
illuminate and inform theory while contributing to efforts to improve prison conditions.
Women in the FRG were sentenced to shorter periods in jail than men and were
mostly housed in co-ed prisons, in which the women's wing was separate and much
smaller (on account of the small ratio of female to male inmates) (Dürkop 1978, 42-43).
By the late 1970s in many West German states, education for women in prison was
something only conceived of as a future project. Though education programs and job
training for men incarcerated in these states in were already implemented, and their
benefits highly regarded, for women there was naught but a nod to similar programs
being established in years to come (Dürkop 1978, 48). Programs for incarcerated women
in the FRG were slow to be developed, in part also because the number of women
incarcerated in the former West Germany was very low— both in comparison to now, and
to the number of men incarcerated at the time. When programming eventually did start to
develop, the education and labor opportunities inside reflected the occupations and
expected tasks of women on the outside, and were thus geared towards retraining women
in a domestic skill set: sewing, cooking, cleaning, and even cosmetics (Dürkop 1978).
The West German prisons were described as being violent institutions, and the
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state as the perpetrator of such violence. Dürkop writes that “the state-inflicted violence
of incarceration is felt by every woman who enters a prison” (Dürkop 1978, 10). The
most direct and severe violence that women experienced in prison was not that which was
personally inflicted between people, but rather the structural violence of broken social
relationships, of the denial of individual needs, etc. that inflicted the most harm on
incarcerated women (Dürkop 1978, 11). Furthermore, the internal suffering that women
who committed murder experienced was akin to a partial death of themselves, especially
if they were made to live in such a desperate emotional state in the prison setting (Dürkop
1978, 12). Dürkop documents the narrative of an unnamed formerly incarcerated woman
who was completely shocked and devastated by her sentence, believing her life to come
to a complete halt for the duration of her incarceration. In time, though, this woman
realized that life did continue in prison—but that it did so excruciatingly slowly (Dürkop
1978, 20). Gertraud Will, in her section titled “Letters from Prison: Excerpts,” describes
how her fellow incarcerated women would have rather stayed in prison longer than they
had to, simply because they had no support and no solid relationships on the outside (Will
1978, 24). This, it seems, speaks to a culture of individualism that can breed isolation; but
more importantly, it shows how women who ended up in prison often did so because of a
lack of healthy, supportive, long-lasting support systems on the outside. Dürkop connects
the plight of women outside with those inside:
Many women perhaps sit behind bars because they were
aimless and powerless to fight back against an unfulfilling
and comfortless life outside of prison, to which they found
no alternative. A prison that seeks to eventually reintegrate
its inhabitants into society must facilitate a reentry that
makes possible an independent new life. (Dürkop 1978,
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49)
Relationships (intimate and otherwise) that women did have prior to their
incarceration were fraught with tension and difficulties: in many cases, they were
particularly unhealthy or abusive. The majority of women who entered the criminal legal
system had themselves committed no “criminal” acts, but rather were accomplices to
husbands or boyfriends. This precluded an association with their own behavior or
independent sense of self, and kept them essentially tied to their boyfriends or husbands
(Dürkop 1978, 25). West German crime was seen as an individual, masculinized
phenomenon by the state, and was treated as such by the courts and prison administrators,
though feminists such as Dürkop worked to illuminate the structural and societal
inequalities that led to crime and incarceration. Feminism in West Germany was aimed at
aligning government structures with the real economic and social needs of women, either
by fundamentally changing the system (as autonomous feminists sought to do) or by
making it simply more inclusive of women (the work of institutional feminists) (Young
1999, 27). A hybrid of these two approaches can be seen in Dürkop's critique of women's
prisons and the criminal justice system, as her book's analysis suggested ways to both
reform and revolutionize women's incarceration in the FRG.

b. German Democratic Republic
East German women were not writing about prison as such; it was not a topic that
the state tolerated much public discussion about, especially considering the secrecy and
political volatility involved in the Stasi disappearing of “dissident” citizens. Accordingly,
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the majority of information about the experiences of incarcerated East Germans,
particularly women, has come to light since Unification. As long as the GDR remained a
viable state, “individuals detained by (its) authorities were forced to agree never to
mention their experiences in detention” (Glees 1998, 166). This secrecy contributed to
much of the misinformation—both positive and negative—that spread through the west
about prisons in East Germany.
While the West German system seems to have treated incarcerated women as
particularly feminine, East German prisons tended to de-feminize women in the criminal
legal system—often at the cost of addressing their health and familial needs. There was
“a particularly high level of criminality and therefore non-femininity imposed upon the
female political prisoner by the GDR regime” (Richmond 2010, 347). Though the system
was supposedly built upon socialist principles of equality, community, and relationality,
“there is no evidence that the East German legal system, created primarily by males, truly
incorporated any 'female voice'” (Schleef 1996, 233). This means that, though women in
East German prisons may have been treated similarly to East German men, this treatment
seems to have been based on the model of a generally masculine citizen, rather than
taking into account many of the physical and emotional needs of women. In her
autobiographical book—published since Unification— Elizabeth Graul recalls her time
spent in GDR prisons. She describes the relative lack of privacy and difficulty in
obtaining feminine hygiene products during her incarceration and explains how she was
given men's clothing and underwear upon her arrival in the prison (Graul 1991, 65). The
femaleness of incarcerated women was stripped away, particularly for political prisoners;
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under the communist system, women in the criminal justice system were, first and
foremost, socialist citizens gone astray.
Debra Schleef argues that although socialist, and particularly East German law, is
much more in line with feminist values of relational, non-adversarial approaches to law
than are western, capitalist legal traditions, the application of these care-based elements
of socialist law in the GDR were not completely successful in eradicating sexism and
hierarchies. This was due in large part, she argues, to existing western ideologies and
value systems among individuals and even, to some extent, the state (particularly as it is
made up of individuals) (Schleef 1996).

V. Conclusion
The practices and policies of crime and the treatment of incarcerated women in
the GDR and FRG reflected the social and economic roles that women in the two states
were expected to fill, since criminal behavior in both was considered a deviance from that
role (as criminal behavior tends to be)—West German women, because they defied
traditional ideals of domesticity and womanhood, and East German women, because to
engage in “criminal” behavior was inherently at odds with socialism for all citizens, male
or female. West German women, in their relative lack of participation in the labor force
(outside of the home), were slow to receive work or educational opportunities in prison
that did not align with an expectation of domesticity and motherhood. East German
women were considered to be more equal in the labor force of the GDR, though they
were treated not simply as working women, but as working mothers; this treatment of
women as mothers did not, it seems, extend to the prison space. If East German women
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were in prison, according to socialist ideology, it was because they lacked the correct
socialist attitude—or deference to the paternalistic state—and needed to be brought back
into this mindset through, first and foremost, socialist education. If West German women
were in prison, it was because they had strayed from their docile, domesticated role
within the heteronormative family structure that is so central to capitalism. While West
German women were made to knit, sew, and apply makeup in prison, East German
women were learning how to be proper socialist laborers. Both the FRG and GDR were
out of touch with the realities of women's lives in each country, nevertheless attempting
to resocialize women as the sorts of idealized females that would most benefit each state
and its ideologies.
The stark differences between East and West German women's prisons thus serves
to underscore this study' larger argument, illuminating how formative social, political,
and economic structures are to the construction of crime and incarceration in a given
state. Prisons are much more than reactions to crime or criminal behavior—though social
and economic systems serve to influence these trends as well—they are the products of
the particular nations in which they exist, adapting to new social, political, and economic
developments as they occur. In this chapter, divergent ideologies of these two capitalist
and communist states were reflected in the very different women's prison systems that
each built.
The tension between the East and West set the stage for the complicated process
of Unification that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, especially as it occurred
legally, among feminists, and in the prisons. Given the disparate relationships of East and
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West German women to the state and to prisons during the Cold War, as examined in this
chapter, it is little wonder that the relatively quick official Unification process would be
fraught with the complexities of trying to reconcile the neighboring states, which had two
very different gender ideologies and realities, as well as two very different approaches to
crime and punishment.
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Chapter Two: De-centralization of Power and its Discontents in the New Capitalist
State, 1989-1995
I. Introduction
When the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, Germany and the world looked
on in awe. No one had anticipated such a peaceful and seemingly sudden end to forty
years of restrictive East German communist rule. Although the impending dismantling of
the German Democratic Republic's government was not immediately clear, the opening
of this physically and culturally significant border was a major concession for the East
German regime, and it was obvious that major changes were on the horizon. When the
final decision was made to dissolve the GDR and absorb it into the Federal Republic of
Germany, capitalist nations around the world rejoiced. But East Germans had mixed
reactions to this monumental change: though the lifting of many restrictions on civil
liberties was certainly a welcome development, many were resistant to capitalism and its
myriad fundamental flaws.
Still, one could view the collapse of the East German government as a victory for
the de-centralization of power—theoretically a central feature of successful capitalist
democracies. Though the downfall of this totalitarian regime certainly spread political
power out among multiple political parties, state governments, and various bureaucracies,
the true nature of this decentralization, and whether it actually gave the power back to 'the
people' is rather less clear. The change was deceptively liberating; in fact, as we can see
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through the eyes of East German women, as well as through those of East German men
and women who were incarcerated, it in fact shifted power away from women and
incarcerated people, power that they had developed under the communist regime.
Additionally, many of the positive aspects of the German Democratic Republic (pensions
in prison, state-supported childcare) ceased to exist under capitalism, exposing the
limitations of Western conceptions of 'freedom' and 'liberty' as they are accessible to
those who most need social securities to survive and to prosper. I argue that although
women and incarcerated people had already been oppressed within the East German
state, the forced shift to capitalism served to further marginalize them— and
disproportionately so, in relation to other East Germans.
Prior to Unification, much of the activism and grassroots organizing in the East
German states had taken place in private spaces such as homes and churches, spaces to
which women had ready access. After Unification and the supposed decentralization of
power, the relocation of such organizing and decision-making effectively excluded
women—due to blatantly sexist reasons, as well as to the fact that many women in East
Germany (as in West Germany) were charged with the primary care of their children.
Additionally, the role of women in East Germany shifted from communist worker to
capitalist consumer—a profound change of ideology and lifestyle.
This decentralization phenomenon can be seen in the restructuring of the East
German prison system as well. While the East German system had been highly
federalized, the West German system gave most of the administrative power of the
prisons to individual states, as well as to the institutions themselves, though the national
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government set certain regulations, many of which were based on European Union
standards. Though there were regulations and guidelines that all the Federal Republic of
Germany's states were supposed to follow, the extent to which certain practices were
implemented was ultimately up to the discretion of each individual state. This new penal
system would have perhaps theoretically worked for the newly incorporated East German
states, except that prisons do not exist in a vacuum; rather, they are inexorably tied to the
communities and societies in which they are built. Thus, many of the characteristics of
these Eastern states—widespread poverty and unemployment, for example—affected the
extent to which these West German programs could be effectively implemented in the
East.
Unification in Germany was an upheaval for all involved—East Germans had to
adjust to an entirely new social, political, legal and economic structure, while West
Germans had to accustom themselves to their new, broader borders, while financially and
politically supporting this new annexation. Throughout this chapter, I show how
government intervention—by the supposedly less totalitarian system—served to
disproportionately disadvantage certain populations, and to disrupt many of the natural
social and political processes that had been occurring prior to Unification. Two such
populations were East German women and incarcerated individuals. Because there is
relatively little information on incarcerated women during this period, I focus this chapter
primarily on these two broader groups in order to best understand the implications that
Unification would have for incarcerated women in contemporary Germany. In the course
of this exploration, I argue that despite the illusion of capitalism as grassroots and purely
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democratic, the experiences of women and incarcerated people in the years surrounding
German Unification reveal a certain degree of top-down power in West Germany's
government and prove that communist regimes do not hold a monopoly on federal
authoritarianism. This chapter also serves to strengthen the thesis' overarching argument
that prisons are institutions that reflect the gender-specific, economic, social, and political
atmospheres in which they exist, by proving that one can indirectly trace and predict the
changes to women's incarceration practices by tracking the changes to un-incarcerated
women's lives and the lives of incarcerated men and women. Furthermore, it ultimately
works to further illuminate how the plight of incarcerated women in Germany reveals
much about the Unification process itself.
It is a long-held belief that women were particularly disadvantaged by
Unification; similarly, the assertion that crime increased significantly during this period is
generally held to be true (Ferree 1995, 10). Yet more important than the numbers of those
in prison (in East Germany, actually a very low figure) was the qualitative make-up of the
incarcerated population, and attention to what was taking place within the prisons. The
West German system was responsible for synthesizing the policies and practices of the
courts and prisons across the East-West border, and their foremost priority was security.
For women in prison, one of the most noticeable changes was the spread of West German
socialization practices into East Germany; though the notion of womanhood was being
streamlined across borders in prison, the clashes between the two feminist ideologies
among East and West German women on the outside reveal the extent to which these
incongruities affected gender roles in the newly unified German state.
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Furthermore, Unification caused a surge of violence against immigrants and
foreigners, mostly as a result of waves of unemployment and poverty in East Germany
that led to a rise of neo-Nazism across Germany. This national anti-foreigner sentiment
seems to have been reflected in the criminal legal system, as prisons began to be filled
with people of color. The significant rise in immigrants and people of color in the
German prison system reflected the changing nature of the prisons, and of the new social
and political uncertainties in the country, which was grappling with the notion of a new
German identity, one that delivered fewer benefits—particularly to its newest citizens
from the East—than promised. Racial and cultural tensions were high, and issues in the
prisons became part of this troubling trend.
Unification was a time when women hoped to be able to engage fully in the
political changes being made—particularly East German women, who saw great potential
in the shifting political landscape, which many hoped would lead to a reformed socialism.
But as it became steadily more apparent that East Germany's communism would simply
be taken over by West Germany's capitalist system, women became disenchanted and
increasingly disengaged with the political landscape. This disengagement parallels and
can thus be compared to the reform of East German prisons—namely, that in lieu of
increased programming and rehabilitative services, West German capitalists spent the
limited resources allotted to East German prisons on increased security, losing many of
the advantages of the socialist prison system. In short, Unification was most detrimental
to those who had been already most marginalized under the GDR's system—women and
those who were incarcerated. Capitalism served to further disadvantage them.
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The term “Unification” is in fact somewhat of a misnomer3—the merger that took
place in Germany in 1990 was in no way an equal combining of two states, in which each
state had to make compromises to their system. Instead, it was essentially an annexation
of the former GDR to become an extension of the FRG; and while both systems
witnessed their own repercussions from this acquisition, the shock to East Germany's
system was certainly the most severe (Berghahn 1995, 29). This process “started from the
idea that, for moral and economic reasons, the East German system should not be the
model for reform. Every change…. reflected the asymmetrical image of unification as a
whole, in which the east was to accede to the west, rather than a joining of two equal
partners” (Berghahn 1995, 41). This new unified Germany was to be a thoroughly
capitalist state.
The collapsing of communism that was occurring throughout Eastern Europe
caused varying degrees of devastation for the economies and people of the individual
states involved. All things considered, the unique situation of East Germany, with its ties
to a strong, established capitalist state that dedicated itself to absorbing the formerly
socialist economy meant that it fared much better than other former communist countries
that had to make the transition with far less assistance. The advantage, however, “of
being exposed rapidly to advanced standards” was tempered by “the disadvantage of
having little influence over the building of the new structure” (Berghahn 1995, 38). East
Germany may have had more state-sanctioned social securities in its day, but was less

3

Though it is much more accurate than “reunification,” which is quite misleading; the Germany that was
created in 1990 had never before existed with those exact borders or that name. Additionally, the FRG
and GDR were created after the end of WWII, and, prior to 1990, neither had ever covered all of what
we now know as Germany.
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self-determining, a conundrum that seemed to drive much of the debate about the merits
of communism versus capitalism. Formally, capitalism had won out, and West Germany
was to lead the way through this transition.

a. Method and Structure
As previously mentioned, there is a dearth of information on incarcerated women
during the years of Unification. This chapter is therefore useful in tracing the changes that
occurred for non-incarcerated women and for incarcerated people of all genders, and
primarily utilizes studies and critical papers from the Unification time period, as well as
more current research. In doing so, we can better understand the historical, cultural,
political, and economic aspects of women's incarceration in Germany, bridging the gap
between the years in which Germany was divided and contemporary, unified Germany.
The chapter begins with an analysis of the minimal information available on
women incarcerated in Germany, describing the changes in programming that
incarcerated East German women were forced to experience—namely, that they had to
transition from being resocialized as socialist workers to being trained exclusively in
domestic, traditionally feminine—by capitalism's standards—tasks. By beginning with
this small window into this aspect of Unification, the chapter will be better prepared to
fill the gaps in information explaining exactly what women in German prisons underwent
during these years—and how someone investigating the history of German women's
prisons can trace the conditions in the divided Germanys to the present state of women's
prisons in the Unified state.
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Then, the focus shifts to looking at how women fared in Unification: how they
had initially hoped that this process would provide an opportunity for increased feminist
political influence and an equal partnership in the new state, but how it soon proved to
only further disenfranchise and disadvantage women in both East and West Germany.
East German women were particularly oppressed by Unification, both in their political
aspirations, as well as in the employment, motherhood, and reproductive rights that they
lost in the process.
The chapter ends with a thorough exploration of the changes and reforms that the
prison systems in East and West Germany underwent throughout the Unification process.
In the East, the decentralization of responsibility for administering prisons—from the
federal government to the individual states—meant that each East German state was
'adopted' by a West German state in order to better facilitate this transition. This overhaul
of East German prisons provided an opportunity for reforms to be made in West German
prisons as well, as it exposed the weaknesses in both systems. However, the change was
not uniformly positive; as pensions for incarcerated East Germans were lost, for instance,
the notion that the switch to democracy was a vast improvement for former GDR prisons
seems particularly unstable.

II. Women in Prison
Based on the very limited information available on changes in incarceration for
women during the Unification years, it appears that conditions for women incarcerated in
West Germany did not substantially change from the pre-Unification years to the years
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directly afterwards. In East Germany, though, it seems that the same sort of transition to
West German penal practices that was happening in the men's prisons was also taking
place in the women's prisons. However, in addition to an increase in security, incarcerated
East German women were also suddenly faced with the same forms of socialization in the
prisons that women incarcerated in West Germany had been subjected to prior to
Unification—that which trained them in domestic tasks.
By “1991 there were 1,575 women in prison” (Messner 1995, 139). Because the
majority of these incarcerated women across Germany were still housed in women's
sections of men's prisons, they usually had little to no “training or social facilities, let
alone work opportunities. In these appendices of male institutions, women are mainly
required to perform traditional tasks assigned to them such as cooking and sewing”
(Messner 1995, 139). This was certainly a shift for East German women, for whom
prison had provided a relatively gender-egalitarian resocialization experience, focusing
on communist values of work and devotion to the state—albeit brutally, at times. This
treatment inside the prisons for women in unified Germany echoed
forms of socialization in operation for women in patriarchal
society. These usually hinge on the learning of passive
roles, while episodes of women's deviance are often
interpreted as an escape from this passivity. Problems are
therefore individualized, and deviant women are deemed to
'individually' fail to conform. In this way, women's social
background is overlooked, while the development of an
individual sense of guilt is strongly encouraged. (Messner
1995, 139)
This learned passivity was spreading across Germany—both within and outside of the
prison, emphasizing this new role that East German women were to play in a capitalist
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society.

III. Women's Role in Unification
The collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989, while in many ways
quite sudden and unexpected, was by no means without context or pretext. Activist
groups had been gaining strength and support in the years leading up to the fall of the
Berlin Wall, and had been increasingly tolerated by the communist state. The nature of
these groups was, however, still rather outside of the scope of the government, and tended
to exist primarily within private spaces. For this reason, among others, women were
central to the rumblings of discontent that eventually caused the seemingly indestructible
pillars of government to disintegrate and eventually collapse completely. This was yet
another fact that set the GDR apart from its fellow eastern European cousins, as in “the
course of the 1989 events, women vanished from the political scene in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, and Poland. This was not the case in East Germany. Like mushrooms
after a warm autumn rain, hundreds of groups, initiatives, and projects popped up out of
nowhere during October and November 1989 in the German Democratic Republic
(GDR)” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992, 101). This was likely due to the fact that activism
throughout East Germany prior to Unification had existed in spaces that were often
occupied by—or at least very accessible to—women. Throughout the GDR, “single
mothers, academic women, artists, actresses, and writers met in churches and universities,
reopened women’s sections of parties and unions, started a multitude of groups and
activities. A feminist web began to stretch out across this Communist state” (Schaeffer-
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Hegel 1992, 101). Additionally, “universities, coffee houses, and political groups—the
traditional male arenas—were not at the forefront this time. Women provided the energy,
filled the refugee camps and the streets” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992, 102). This wealth of
woman-powered activity worked both with and against the state to fight for peace and
against the patriarchal elements of the GDR's government.
Women were not only instrumental in the activist circles prior to Unification, but
their work contributed to the Wende, or Turning Point, as “they generated the pressure
that finally broke down Stasi power and the Communist regime” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992,
102). Immediately after the Wall fell, there was a flurry of activity, with different groups
finally able to come out of their semi-hidden spaces and publicly acknowledge and join
forces with one another. At this time,
lesbians, female theologians, peace and human rights
activists, and academic and church women came together
on December 3, 1989, to create the Independent Women's
League, or Unabhängiger Frauenverband (UVF). This is
not only the day when East German women expressed their
desire to unite their 'different voices' within a larger
organization; it also signaled their intent to play an active
role in the transformation of state and society. (Young
1999, 74)
The rise and fall of the UVF would prove to be indicative of the political journey of East
German women as a whole throughout Unification.
Social networks and political groups that existed prior to 1989 had been confined
to church and university spaces; after the fall of the Wall, they were “able to constitute
themselves as movements in the early summer months of 1989 as the East German
political opportunity structure 'broadened' and revealed the first signs of the state's
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vulnerability” (Young 1999, 75). At first, this broadening provided these women's groups
with the opportunity to participate fully and openly in the political arena, though this
accessibility would soon diminish. The conception of space as being a determining factor
in who was involved in political organizing (though of course the demographics of those
involved in political organizing also determined the spaces in which this work occurred)
was instrumental in women's changing political power.
An early cause of unrest for many of the feminist and other women's activist
groups (many of which began as peace and human rights organizations) in the GDR was
the increasingly clear realization that the collapse of their government would not lead to a
better and more democratic socialist system, but that it would instead require them to be
absorbed into an existing (capitalist) government. They “did not see themselves as direct
opponents of the socialist state; rather, they strove to reform socialism. Their goals were
to establish basic civil rights such as free speech, free and secret elections, and freedom
to travel. Issues of structural equality of the sexes, which existed to a large extent in the
GDR, were not relevant for these groups” (Miethe 1999, 6). This structural equality did
not exist in the FRG, which presented the question of what sort of equality the unified
German state would provide for the women within it.
The significance of women's roles in East and West Germany prior to Unification
continued into 1990 and the political proceedings that took place during that year. The
intense political upheaval seemed to have great potential for women to become
meaningfully involved in the new East German government, whatever form that was to
take. Particularly in the months “between the Wende and the official joining of the two
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German states, many feminists, especially in the West, hoped that conditions for women
would improve and that political institutions would be forced to fulfill long-requested
legal demands” (Berghahn 1995, 37). The UVF was effective in bringing the various
women's groups together. Their main purpose was to act as “the umbrella organization for
a large number of feminist and nonfeminist, religious and nonreligious, lesbian and
heterosexual groups of women,” and “was resolved to fight for the survival of at least
some of the achievements which, in spite of Communist atrocities, had enriched the lives
of East German women and which—in spite of Communist suppression, hardships, and
deficiencies—had made the GDR the state with possibly the most advanced women’s
rights legislation in history” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992, 103). In short, they fought to
improve their position in Germany—and to not lose the relative equality they'd had in the
GDR.
The political de-centralization of power seemed promising as well. The reigning
(and for all intents and purposes, only) political party in the GDR, the Socialist Unity
Party, or Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) had held all of the official
governmental power. Therefore, “with the collapse of the SED government, the
opposition groups had the opportunity to leave the private space and express themselves
publicly. This new possibility was cast in a positive light... At the same time, however,
the nature of political activity changed” (Miethe 1999, 13). This dissipation of political
power, with its new ability to take place in the public arena, essentially handed much of
the activism and organizing to men, who were more able to devote themselves to public
politics, not having children and families to take care of or sexist Western stereotypes to
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combat. The demands of work and family responsibilities were incongruent with aroundthe-clock political organizing:
With German unification, the locus of political activity was
shifted out of private space and into the public sphere. At
certain points the private space remained a locus of political
action for the women, but its importance became
significantly smaller under the conditions of a democratic
society than it had been during the period of dictatorship.
Activities in the private sphere did not have the far-reaching
effects that they had had under the GDR. These changes
also entailed fundamentally different conditions for women.
(Miethe 1999, 13)
At first, briefly, it did seem that this new political structure could be an avenue to
affect positive policy-level change for women. The Independent Women's League drafted
legislation that they hoped would be included in the new system (Berghahn 1995, 42).
Expounding upon the rights that they had become accustomed to during the decades of
relative sexual and economic emancipation in the GDR, the group fought for even more
feminist progress at the governmental level, arguing during the constitutional debates for
“equal rights for unmarried and married persons, more financial support of families to
help with childrearing responsibilities, and more daycare facilities” (Berghahn 1995, 42).
The New Forum, a central citizens' group dedicated to creating new legislation and
directing the Unification process, was initially a seemingly perfect place for women's
groups to be at the heart of decision-making. This proved to not be the case; “although
the New Forum considered itself a meeting place for all opposition activity, it soon
became evident that women's political interests were given no space there.” Many groups
“quit the New Forum.... after their demand for quotas was dismissed. The women who
remained in the New Forum did not articulate explicit political interests of women”
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(Miethe 1999, 7). At the time of Unification, women constituted 40% of the New Forum,
but within 5 years after Unification, that number had dropped to 20% (Miethe 1999, 8).
The first Germany-wide “elections, like those for the new State Parliaments in October
1990 and for the first all-German Bundestag in December 1990, proved to be largely
detrimental to women. The Independent Women’s League.... lost all the way down the
line” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992, 107). Though women's political activity continued into the
1990s and beyond, this crushing defeat was a major blow to the momentum of the
movement, and set back many of the intended feminist projects of the time.
Though there is clearly ample evidence of the ways in which women extracted
themselves or were expelled from the public political sphere in the years following
Unification, this assertion admittedly relies on a masculinist, patriarchal conception of
politics. If this conception were
widened to include nonparliamentary/nonelectoral contexts,
it can be shown that women of the movements of 1989 are
not less active than before Unification. All of these women
are still working in diverse nonelectoral groups and
contexts.... In the political consciousness of these women,
this is less a withdrawal from "politics" than a questioning
of whether the institutional political arena is the only
possible or most desirable one. (Miethe 1999, 19)
Additionally, East German women continued to be politically active in their opposition to
the many anti-feminist, anti-woman changes. They “organized demonstrations in Berlin,
Dresden, and elsewhere.... They went out onto the streets to fight for their reproductive
rights and against the installation of West Germany’s abortion law. Later, when capitalist
practices relentlessly started to devour socialist achievements, they protested against the
destruction of social institutions” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992, 107). They were not going to
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concede their rights without a strong show of resistance.
Ultimately, though “the integration of the two societies, in which the demand for
gender equality is rather common, could have been an opportunity to work out higher
legal and social standards for the whole of the country.... the actual process of policymaking only illustrated the reflected image of the Western status quo and the approach of
quick adjustment to the Western model” (Berghahn 1995, 38). The issue of
decentralization seems to have been a key reason for this complicated relationship that
East German women had to their changing state; “the paradox arises that for some East
German women the pluralistic and democratic structure of the Federal Republic appears
even more awkward and inaccessible than the former socialist system in East Germany”
(Berghahn 1995, 45). The political transformations enabled—and in many ways
emboldened—men to become more powerful, but left many women behind.
Not only did women lose their foothold in the political sphere, but they suffered
economically and socially as well. It has become entirely commonplace for scholarly
commentators on this period in German history to state that women were the most
disadvantaged by Unification: “the phrase 'women are the losers of the unification' has
become virtually a cliché; moreover, it does reflect reality” (Ferree 1995, 10). Nearly as
soon as the Wende phenomenon began, East German women, specifically, were widely
known to be suffering the most, “yet the question of how this result could have been
avoided has not played a substantial role in legal debates” (Berghahn 1995, 37). East
German women also lost many of the concrete, government-issued rights that they'd had
prior to 1989. For example, Unification almost immediately brought with it the abolition
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of “the monthly housework day for women and mothers, the large-scale release for
parents to nurse their sick children, lengthy fully-paid maternity leaves (six weeks before
and twenty weeks after the birth), better job security for single mothers (guaranteed until
the child's third birthday), and financial support for a sufficient number of public child
care facilities” (Berghahn 1995, 39). Though gender equality in West Germany had
supposedly been legally guaranteed in the FRG's constitution, “unlike the FRG, the East
German Constitution was amended by two clauses which compelled the state to make
equality for women a reality in economic and professional life” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992,
103). The collapse of the GDR meant the disappearance of these securities.
Were West German women as consistently disadvantaged by the Unification
process as East German women? Or did Unification simply put West and East German
women on an even keel with one another, since they were now governed by the same
system? Because West German women had the advantage of having worked within this
system for many years, they had long since developed methods for working against it.
East German women's
concern with making policy and holding political office
makes much less experiential sense to (West German)
women in private patriarchy, who perceive their lives as
being more directly shaped by nonstate actors and by
cultural norms and expectations that are not formally
enacted into law. Within the context of private patriarchy,
the role of the state is more indirect and thus less visible,
and the more obvious targets for action seem both more
diffuse and more personalized. To those accustomed to
public patriarchy, this focus can look like too much concern
with symbolic issues, such as language, that are "trivial"
compared to direct confrontations with policymakers.
(Ferree 1995, 20)
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Though East German women had seen their male counterparts as instrumental in their
activism towards peace and better governance, East German men showed little loyalty to
these women in the course of integrating themselves into government structures of the
unified state. These same men were fighting their own fight: to gain political ground in a
climate that was no more tolerant to communism and its former citizens than it had been
prior to the collapse of the Wall. East German men effectively pushed East German
women out of the public political sphere and “embarked on defining new roles for their
former partners: dependent, housewife, mother. Because socialist dogma of equality was
exclusively concerned with women’s ability to work, it had not touched men’s patriarchal
inclinations in the slightest. While in the old Communist order, women’s work was useful
for men’s economic goals, this was no longer the case” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992, 108). East
German women, after years in the GDR, had not been provided “with training in
resistance, or with organizational skills such as debating, electing a Chair, preparing an
agenda, and other formal procedures. Nobody had learned anything of the sort in the
GDR and West German women could not help them, as they themselves rejected utterly
most forms of organized political action” (Schaeffer-Hegel 1992, 108). Thus, East
German women were left with very few allies.
In addition to the political, economic, and social disadvantaging of women that
occurred, particularly in East Germany, clashing ideologies and approaches to activism
between East and West German women led to a fracturing of the feminist forces at work
in the newly unified country. This was particularly troubling to many activist women, as
they had hoped that the fall of the Wall would enable them to join forces and trade ideas
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with their sisters on the other side. Instead, they found that the two groups had
experienced distinctive forms of oppression and different relationships to their respective
states, and had therefore developed very disparate needs and attitudes towards gender and
feminism. Two very “differently grounded feminist identities that arose in these
differently organized social contexts have been forced by unification now to share the
same political space. Each has a tendency to disparage the degree of feminist
understanding of the other with terms such as backward, hypocritical, arrogant, a
theoretical, callous, naive, hypersensitive, know-it-all” (Ferree 1995, 16). The fact that
East and West German women shared a common ethnicity, language, and history—prior
to 1945—led many to assume at first that they would share many of the same issues and
goals. In fact, these commonalities “made German feminists underestimate the
difficulties of communication and the gulf in experience and identity that was still to be
bridged when the Wall fell. The sheer unexpectedness of such fundamental differences
blocked many attempts to listen to and learn from theory grounded in a significantly
different structuring of women's lives” (Ferree 1995, 17-18). This led to a profound
'othering' effect, in which each group saw their own feminist efforts and theorizing as
more legitimate or developed. They went so far as to accuse the other side of “not 'really'
being feminism, according to the standards of one's own collective self-representation,
have contributed to the disillusionment and discouragement of both sides” (Ferree 1995,
21). This sort of tension was extremely divisive, and served to further splinter feminist
efforts throughout Germany.
Another immediate effect of the spread of capitalism to the Eastern states was the
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transition towards private property ownership, a transition that had widespread
repercussions, particularly for women. In addition to being the hardest hit in the formal
employment market, they lost many of the bartering and informal labor practices that
they had become adept at over the years of communist rule. Essentially, capitalism turned
East German women away from their ideological role as producers and towards one in
which they were consumers—and their bodies were in many ways the stage for this
transformation. They “were affected directly and immediately.... when state-owned
property was transformed into private property. Because more women than men were
without income, their opportunities to obtain mortgages and loans for buying land and/or
real estate were more limited” (Sandole-Staroste 2002, 164). Housing costs, as well as all
other living expenses, increased sharply in the former GDR states. This particularly
affected women, who were often responsible for household finances and for making ends
meet. In the new capitalist market, “the networks where goods and services were bartered
had disintegrated because everything had become easily available for those who could
afford it. The material situation many women found themselves in after reunification,
with costs increasing and resources dwindling, often caused frustration and resentment”
(Sandole-Staroste 2002, 167). This economic desperation would eventually lead to an
increase in women's incarceration rates—with fewer resources and more expenses,
German women were left with difficult choices in how to support themselves and their
families.
This change also directly and indirectly affected women's (and men's) ideological
roles in East Germany—from producer to consumer. This “transformation of state
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socialism to capitalism introduced capitalism's essential pillars into the everyday life of
East German women: private property and consumption, and clearly defined gender roles
and class distinctions—all reinforcing Germany's patriarchal structures. This impacted
widely on women's material conditions and often, though not always, limited their
opportunities” (Sandole-Staroste 2002, 168). This deterioration of economic security for
East German women seems to be directly linked to criminal activity among women after
Unification, and to the subsequent increase in incarceration. Women were no longer able
to labor and produce in the capacity that they had been used to—now their role was that
of consumer, which many were unable to fulfill.
Women's bodies were, as they often are, the battleground upon which this
transition can be clearly seen:
West Germany's capitalist system not only 'encourages'
women to objectify and package their bodies to conform to
sexual stereotypes, it also 'educates' women to become
consumers. Material consumption, and not incomegenerating work roles, is to be the basis of how East
German women define their identity and roles in reunified
Germany. Because material consumption is essential for
capitalism, it requires a set of corresponding values and
behaviors and the construction of needs, wants, and
preferences for nonessential goods. (Sandole-Staroste 2002,
161)

This new identity was a fundamental shift for East German women, and not all women
simply woke up one day and became willing or enthusiastic capitalists—though some
certainly did. For many, however, the process happened gradually, and often subtly.
Because this was a transition that required them to change not only their habits but also
their very identities, “by 'making' her a 'natural' consumer, who packages her body in
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accordance with sexual and other stereotypes, and 'persuading' her to embrace a lifestyle
that is defined by powerful commercial interests,” it was met with significant resistance
by many East German women (Sandole-Staroste 2002, 161-2). Still, the retention of
communist and socialist beliefs did not save even these women from falling prey to the
capitalist machine, causing many to suffer from widespread unemployment and poverty.
Unfortunately, the essential role of women in German Unification has been
marginalized or even completely forgotten, despite their obvious participation in this
historic moment:
German unification was symbolized by the two male heads
of government, Helmut Kohl and Lothar de Maziere. In the
media they were celebrated as the 'fathers of unification.'
This media language makes symbolically clear the
gendered process that actually took place in the course of
the transition and the unification that followed: the
increasing invisibility of women in public political action
and in institutionalized politics. (Miethe 1999, 2)

Despite certain major gains since Unification for East German women—for instance, the
election of former-GDR citizen Angela Merkel as Chancellor of Germany—the
hegemonic narrative surrounding Unification still tends to downplay or fully exclude the
substantial role that women's and feminist groups played in the late 1980s and early
1990s in Germany. The effect of this exclusion has been that the loss of rights and of the
potential to create positive feminist change in Germany during this period has been
brushed over. Unification, in this light, seems to have been a gender-neutral process that
benefitted all and had the best interests of all at heart. As we have seen, this was not the
case, and the losses that women suffered were both significant and widespread.
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Ultimately, the changes that occurred in the political and personal lives of East
German women during Unification were beyond their control; capitalism's influence,
with its supposed increase in democracy and freedom, was disproportionately
disadvantaging to the women of the former GDR, whose active particiption in the early
days of Unification have been largely forgotten. Women were not alone, however, in their
Unification discontent. Incarcerated populations suffered from the capitalist takeover as
well, though in even less publicized or recognized ways. Though Unification may have
benefitted certain Germans, these improvements did not extend to women—or to
incarcerated people, for whom capitalism and democracy proved to be a bumpy road.

IV. The Prison System
The effects of decentralization in Germany can be also seen in the changes that
took place in the prisons, particularly those in East Germany. As with women's rights and
benefits, prisons in East Germany were in many ways disadvantaged by this shift.
Included in the legal and political adjustments that constituted the Unification process
was the takeover of East German prisons and of its criminal legal system by West
Germany. With the enactment of Unification legislation, East German prisons were
immediately under the jurisdiction of the West German system, and because this system
left most of the administrative powers of the criminal legal system and the prisons in the
hands of the individual states, each of the five East German states being incorporated into
the West German nation was adopted by an already established West German state,
known as the 'guardian' state. This meant that “the administration in the new federal
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states has been built up by sending staff from the old states to the 'partner' states. So, for
example, the staff of the prison administration in the Ministry of Justice and also most of
the prison governors in Saxony are persons who have been sent temporarily (some of
them into permanent posts) from Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg” (Dünkel 1995, 103).
West German prison administrators, without in-depth knowledge of the problems facing
East German prisons, were suddenly responsible for their renovations and reforms, and
the West German criminal legal model became that which was used nationally—leading
to a plethora of problems for East German criminal legal institutions.
Not only did East German sentencing and programming practices need to be
aligned with those of West Germany, but the facilities themselves needed to be
substantially renovated and brought up to European standards of prison livability—
standards that West Germany also had not met. Though the supposed demilitarization of
the facilities and administration of East German prisons was at first glance a positive
change, the actual economic, political, and social conditions of the former GDR states
posed many complicating problems for this to successfully occur. In principle, the rights
of incarcerated citizens were
to be safeguarded against the background of the basic
principles of the German constitution, namely the rule of law
and the principle of welfare, or the 'social state principle'.
The latter principle, which entails a duty on the part of the
state to support its more needy citizens, has particular
implications for prisoners. For imprisoned citizens, support
means rehabilitation, which in a sense can be seen as one of
their rights (Messner 1995, 133).
Economic and political conditions of East German prisons made the fulfillment of these
rights a particular challenge, and one that West Germany did not immediately or fully
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grasp.
The early 1990s was a time when prisons in both East and West Germany were
facing increasingly complex issues; for instance, “between 1983 and 1991 the number of
drug addicts in prison doubled.... they now represent 20 percent of the male and 40
percent of the female prison population respectively” and by 1994, one in five
incarcerated drug users—or more than 1,000 people—was HIV positive or had AIDS
(Messner 1995, 138). Unification only served to complicate and intensify many of the
issues facing German prisons, though it had had the potential to call attention to many of
these problems and enable positive changes.
Targets of a large portion of these changes were the guards, administrators,
lawyers, and judges and other employees of East German prisons: it was believed that
they would be obstacles to the implementation of the new “democratic” prison system,
since their training had been militaristic and totalitarian. Following this line of thinking,
“the creation of a climate supportive of resocialization will require in the first instance a
'resocializing of the resocializers', that is, the comprehensive education of prison
personnel” (Dünkel 1995, 108). Though prison administrators in the East had been
replaced by West Germans,
the 'normal' prison officers had to be taken over from the
former GDR prison service, which was strongly influenced
by the Ministry of the Interior and militaristic hierarchies.
Most former prison governors had to be dismissed because
they worked together with the ministry of state security
('Stasi'). This kind of transfer from West to East Germany
led to a transfer of different prison regimes ('styles') based
on the different prison regimes in the old federal states.
(Dünkel 1995, 110)
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The mix of East and West German prison officers was a source of tension as well; this
new hierarchy that suddenly placed West German officials above East German officers
was fraught with resentments and resistance and diverted attention from the needs of
incarcerated individuals.
The main focus of the renovations of the East German prisons became to increase
security and prevent 'escapes', and though a large amount of money was “transferred to
the new federal states as part of the process of German unification, the prison system is
likely to continue to be regarded as of secondary importance. As a first priority,
improvements regarded as necessary on security grounds are proving the easiest to
implement, whilst the establishment of treatment or education programs is regarded as
being less important” (Dünkel 1995, 108). This strategy had problematic and negative
implications; in already poverty- and unemployment-stricken post-Unification East
Germany, the low prioritization of education, treatment, and job-training programs served
only to further disadvantage incarcerated East Germans. Meanwhile, the increase in
security measures begs two important questions: first, if security measures in the
supposedly totalitarian East German prisons were inadequate, what does this indicate
about West German prison standards? And second, if resocialization and rehabilitation
were primary tenets of the West German criminal legal system, was this increased
security a sign that East German prisons and incarcerated East Germans were considered
un-resocializable or un-rehabilitatable?
The extent to which decentralization of governmental power in the East German
states gave agency to citizens and more local authorities was particularly complicated by

76
the nature of prison reform in the new system. Such reforms did not come about as part of
“a wider movement for societal improvement.... Instead the impetus has come from
above, that is from prison experts imported from the West and installed in influential
positions in the ministries and in positions of authority in the prisons” (Dünkel 1995, 95).
There was a new conservatism emerging in Germany at large, contributing to this focus
on security rather than social services in the prisons. With reform being primarily
security-driven, and conceived and implemented by supposed experts from the West, it is
little wonder that the unique needs of incarcerated East Germans were a relatively low
priority in the reorganization of this system. In fact, many of the “positive aspects of the
GDR prison system...were lost in unification, such as (relatively) better rewards for work
and the inclusion of pensions” (Dünkel 1995, 110). In many ways, this parallels the losses
in social services and benefits felt by East German women during Unification in favor of
greater 'freedom'. Throughout Unification, these two sides of the same Western coin—
'freedom' and 'safety/security'—trumped social services and labor and family benefits,
much to the detriment of women and people in prison.
While East German prisons were the primary focus of penal reform in the early
1990s, the overhaul of such a system was also an opportunity for some critics and policymakers to take a closer look at certain aspects of West German prisons—which were also
in rather shabby physical condition—that did not meet certain European or even
nationally-determined West German standards (Dünkel 1995, 111). One such aspect in
need of change in West Germany was the number of people housed together. The FRG's
Prison Act—the primary piece of legislation dictating criminal legal policy in West
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Germany—decreed that no more than eight people were to live in a single cell.
Overcrowding in the Western prisons meant that in many cases, this standard was no
longer heeded. In East Germany, meanwhile, this standard had never been set, and the
prisons had been designed based on a different, more socialist-based model. As of the
spring of 1993, “71 percent of prisoners in the new federal states still had to share their
cells with another prisoner. In the West the proportion was 42 percent, which is clearly
less but which does not come near to meeting the objective of the Prison Act” (Dünkel
1995, 101). Both prisons systems needed to make significant improvements in this area,
yet neither were willing to prioritize allocation of the resources needed to achieve these
objectives. The state-by-state discrepancies carried over into high-security measures and
administrative punishments as well. The harshest form of punishment, as legally defined
by the Prison Act, was solitary confinement (which was not to be given for more than
four weeks at a time). Though instances of this practice had decreased overall in West
Germany in the twenty years prior to Unification, there were still huge discrepancies in
the extent to which individual states chose to utilize it (Dünkel 1995, 107).
Short prison sentences were a staple of the West German criminal legal system's
penal approach, though their rehabilitative capacity was often questioned and criticized,
leading to more instances of fines in place of these sentences—though such monetary
penalties can hardly be defined as rehabilitative, and seem in fact to be purely punitive. In
the year 1991, “the number of persons found guilty of an offense, including both adults
and juveniles, was 622,390, of which 521,000 received a fine. Since the late 1980s, fines
represent on average more than 80 percent of all penalties” (Messner 1995, 132). By the
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mid-1990s, just six percent of all punishments given in German courts included prison
sentences longer than one year, and one third of the German prison population was
serving less than 9 months (Messner 1995, 132 and Albrecht 1997, 77). In addition to
concerns about short sentences being a waste of the state's resources, there were many
who criticized the early release of prisoners, which was considered by some to be “at
odds with the official principle that the treatment of offenders is to lead to rehabilitation.
Prisoners are so quickly in and out of custody that no treatment is possible for those who
both need it and are entitled to it under the constitution” (Messner 1995, 132). The jury is
still out on whether or not these shorter sentences and a reduced emphasis on
incarceration was beneficial for reducing crime and for resocializing and rehabilitating
Germany's citizens; regardless, both short sentences and fines were not elements of East
Germany's system until Unification dictated their implementation in these states.
What had, however, been shown to reduce recidivism was the increase in allowing
incarcerated people out on work furloughs, often an element of open prison programs.
Prior to Unification, West German prisons had found these furloughs to be very
successful. Many of the Western prison reforms of the 1970s “related to the relaxation of
the prison regime and furloughs (home leave). In the period 1977 to 1990 alone, the
number of furloughs and day leaves.... per 100 prisoners increased almost fourfold,
without any increase in abuse of these measures in terms of not returning to prison or
committing crimes during the leave period” (Dünkel 1995, 104). Though West Germany
had excelled in open prison programs, East Germany had never experimented with these
relaxed-security facilities or with work furloughs (Dünkel 1995, 103). In part, this was
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due to the highly successful, well-paid work positions within East German prisons—
positions that were lost through Unification. By 1992, “there were 194 prison institutions,
of which 151 were defined as 'closed', 22 as 'open', and 21 as prison for juveniles. Of the
59,002 places available, 45,892 (78 percent) were occupied” (Messner 1995, 133).
Though prisons were not filled to full capacity, open prisons were by no means the
prevailing model. The “provision and use of open prisons which the legislature required
in the Prison Act has also led to an unforeseen degree of variation in interpretation, both
at state level and at the level of individual institutions” (Dünkel 1995, 102).
Implementation and interpretation of this concept varied greatly from state to state, and
especially so between the Western and Eastern states, and generally had little or nothing
to do with the behavior or degree of assumed danger of the prison population in each state
or institution. The so-called 'open prison' was “described only in terms of absent or
reduced security measures” (Dünkel 1995, 102-3). Even the specificities of an open
prison were very much left to the interpretations of individual states. Besides “differences
about the definition of open prisons, there is also considerable variation amongst the old
federal states in the extent to which use is made of such prisons.... The city-states, who
certainly do not have less difficult prisoners than the other federal states, have an aboveaverage number of prisoners in open prisons” (Dünkel 1995, 103). Discrepancies in
interpretation and implementation were practical as well as ideological. For example, the
economic situation of the Eastern states was not so accommodating of this concept;
where unemployment was higher—the East—fewer work furloughs were granted, and
open prisons were less successfully established.
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Prisons in post-Unification East Germany, in some ways, served the state by
reducing unemployment; after Unification, people incarcerated in East Germany lost the
high wages and state pensions that they had previously had while incarcerated.
Furthermore, the Eastern states granted far fewer prisoners work release than the West
did, owing largely to extremely high unemployment rates in the East. In the Eastern states
“work-release prisoners are an extreme exception (only eight permissions per 100
prisoners, in comparison to 47 in the old federal states)” (Dünkel 1995, 105). There was
also the question of how many East German prisons to close, how many to renovate, and
whether or not to build new facilities (Dünkel 1995, 109). What was decided was that the
prison system would expand, allowing for “an imprisonment rate of approximately 100
per 100,000 of population, if prisons were used to full capacity” (Dünkel 1995, 109). This
would be slightly higher than the old West German states, and significantly higher than
the old East German states. By “31 March 1993, the imprisonment rate in the old federal
states was 92 per 100,000 population.... The lowest rate of imprisonment in any of the old
federal states, 53 per 100,000 population in Schleswig-Holstein, is still significantly
higher than the overall average of the new federal states (35 per 100,000)” (Dünkel 1995,
109). Incarceration rates in East Germany had dropped drastically in the first few years of
Unification—from 187 to 29 people in prison for every 100,000 people in the East
German states from 1989 until 1993 (Messner 1995, 144). This “can be explained by the
extreme severity of the old regime, but also by the fact that many East Germans may now
be serving a sentence or be remanded in custody in the West” (Messner 1995, 144). The
goal of the supposedly reforming system was to bring this number up, though not quite to
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that of pre-Unification East Germany—which had included a disproportionate number of
political prisoners. The prison system was, in many respects, expanding under West
German rule, despite the belief that this capitalist takeover of the criminal legal system
was one that reduced the role of government.
This expansion was particularly deleterious for those in East German prisons,
which, in relation to West Germany, had fewer resources, more outdated and in many
cases dilapidated facilities, and a lower incarcerated population to begin with. This
“danger of inequality between what can be offered to prisoners in the West and in the East
can be avoided most effectively by keeping down the numbers of prisoners in the new
federal states” (Dünkel 1995, 109). Unfortunately, this is not the direction in which the
prisons were going—incarceration rates were in fact slated to rise. Certain criminal legal
scholars noted the problematic nature of such expansion and called for reforms that
would particularly benefit the East German prisons—benefits which the extension of
West German policies and programs into the former GDR states seemed unable to
achieve. Among these reforms were included
a strengthening of the co-responsibility of prisoners, the
integration of voluntary advisers and citizens from outside
the institution into the rehabilitative endeavors of the
institution, increased opening of the prison by means of
more liberal provision for visits including unsupervised
longer visits...and the increased use of relaxation of the
prison regime and furloughs are key concepts in this regard.
The provision of telephone boxes in prison, the granting of
permission to individual prisoners to listen to the radio and
watch television programs of their choice, and other
measures designed to increase prisoners' access to
information and opportunities to communicate with others
are relatively expensive and make explicit the social
(welfare; sozialstaatliche) aspects of the sentence of
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imprisonment. (Dünkel 1995, 109)

Many of these reforms were care-based and would help shift the focus of East German
prisons towards resocialization and rehabilitation—goals that Unification's initial
security-driven remodels had de-prioritized. The fact that these reforms were still being
called for by 1995—five years after Unification—shows the incredibly slow nature of
prisoners' rights reforms during this time, and in this political climate.
As with the oft-heard statement that women were the losers of Unification, it is
also commonly understood that Unification caused—either directly or indirectly—an
increase in criminal behavior in both East and West Germany. There are many theories to
explain this phenomenon, and statistics to argue both that crime did and did not increase
at this juncture in history; regardless of the numbers themselves, it seems more important
to look at the causes of economic, social and political discontent—discontent that was
certainly present, despite the title given to the fall of the East German government: “the
Peaceful Revolution”. Attention regarding the matter of increased crime has been directed
primarily towards immigrant groups and other “foreigners.” Indeed, the Unification years
saw a significant increase in the proportion of immigrants and individuals with
immigration backgrounds in the criminal legal and prison systems. In fact, the numbers
showed that incarceration rates were “decreasing for German offenders, a wellestablished phenomenon that originated at the end of the sixties. The increase in the
number of prisoners at large is solely due to increased numbers of foreign minorities”
(Albrecht 1997, 80-1). This is a troubling trend, as it seems to indicate a criminalizing of
foreigners, immigrants, and non-white Germans during this period.
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West German criminologist Hans Joachim Schneider cited the following reasons
for why crime supposedly rose after Unification: first, that people (here, he seems to refer
specifically to East Germans) would be dissatisfied with their own economic drop or
disappointingly meager rise. Crime would thus “be committed out of a feeling of
deprivation or frustration.” Second, that the clash of two opposing systems of social and
economic organization would lead to conflict between people, many of whom were
young and/or of the working class, and who “have never properly learned peaceful
strategies of conflict resolution,” so “a rise in the crime rate is almost inevitable.” Third,
that the sudden increase in consumer goods in East Germany would cause a rise in
property crime. Fourth, that a supposed increase in quality of life would lead parents to
neglect their children and adolescents, who would then create strong subcultures and
engage in delinquency. Fifth, that the underdevelopment of the East based on the largescale migration into the West, as well as the general lack of economic resources, would
further disillusion and disenfranchise East Germans. Finally, that
all these social and economic changes will further speed up
the societal disorganization that had set in decades ago in
the German Democratic Republic. Social and interpersonal
interaction will become defective. Social groups such as
schools, families, neighborhoods, occupational, and leisure
time groups lose their capacity of informal social control.
This must not be confused with self-help or the extension
of the state control network; rather, it constitutes a
voluntary, democratic self-control. (Schneider 1991, 2912)
Here, even through his strongly capitalist bias, Schneider recognized the strong presence
of non-governmental community power structures throughout East Germany prior to
Unification—power structures that were destroyed with the collapse of the GDR, leading
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to civil unrest and possibly an increase in criminal activity.
What role did those with immigration backgrounds living in Germany play in
crime and incarceration during the years of Unification? By “the late 1980s (West)
Germany's success in reducing the overall size of the prison population, as well as in
improving the safeguards theoretically offered to those in custody, was praised.... More
recently the pendulum has swung back again. The German prison population is rising,
fueled, it seems, by public anxiety in the aftermath of Unification, but also by the
perceived threats of immigration and drug related crime” (Messner 1995, 128). Certainly
there was an increase in the percentage of people in German prisons who had foreign or
immigration backgrounds; “the proportion of immigrant prisoners rose considerably in
the last decade and amounts to a fourth of the prison population (including pretrial
detainees and sentenced prisoners, youth and adult prisoners)” (Albrecht 1997, 79).
Though taken on its own, this statistic could perhaps be accounted for by the increase in
foreign immigration after Unification, there was also the fact that “foreign offenders are
likely to be handled differently compared with German offenders on legal grounds, as
decision making in the criminal justice system in several respects takes account of bonds
to conventional society such as place of residence.” Additionally, the rise of drug markets
in Germany and of “participation of some ethnic minorities in black markets, especially
drug markets, is likely to lead to disproportionate use of pretrial detention and prison
sentences. This reflects concern not for ethnic minorities but for illicit drugs, which
continue to provoke massive criminal justice reactions” (Albrecht 1997, 37). It therefore
seems that a variety of complicating factors seems to have caused this increase. The rise
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in foreigners in German prisons did not necessarily correlate to a rise in crime, however,
as “every sixth foreigner in German prisons at the beginning of 1994 was awaiting
deportation, not serving time for a crime” (Albrecht 1997, 80). Of foreigners and those
with immigration backgrounds who were serving time for having committed a crime,
“drug offenders are a major reason for the sharp increase in foreign offenders since the
late 1980s. Prison data…. show that drug offenses substantially account for the increase
in foreign prisoners during the 1980s and 1990s. Property offenses add also considerably
to imprisonment rates” (Albrecht 1997, 81). Additionally, much of the violent crime
attributed to these minority groups was actually violence inflicted against them by nativeborn Germans, especially as unemployment and poverty in East Germany postUnification led to a rise in neo-Nazi activity (Messner 1995, 143). Unification “caused
not an increase in crime, but rather the increased victimization of more vulnerable
groups” (Messner 1995, 144). This victimization was exacerbated by the criminalization
and incarceration of such groups. If there were discrepancies between how East and West
Germans were treated within their respective prisons, this phenomenon also certainly
existed for non-Germans incarcerated in German prisons, as “some minorities experience
a different kind of prison regime from that experienced by German inmates. Foreign
prisoners participate less in furlough programs and prison leave programs” (Albrecht
1997, 81). Incarcerated foreigners in German prisons faced discrimination in terms of
access to certain rights and privileges—including television and other forms of
entertainment. They also tended to have little connection to the outside world visa vis
family and community (Albrecht 1997, 83). These conditions further blurred the
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distinction between perpetrators and victims of crime and the criminal legal system under
the newly unified system: was the purpose of such a system to perpetuate oppression
present outside of the prison space?

V. Conclusion
Though the amount of information on incarcerated women in Germany between
the years directly prior to Unification and those following it is inadequate to draw many
conclusions, the extensive information detailed in this chapter concerning women outside
the prisons—particularly East German women—as well as the prison system in general,
works to shed light on the significant changes in women's incarceration policies and
practices across Germany between the time when the country was divided and the
contemporary unified state, as I explore in the next chapter. Additionally, this chapter is
central to the overall argument of this thesis, revealing the extent to which political,
economic, and gendered changes to the FRG and GDR reverberated throughout
Germany's unifying prison system.
Unification had a monumental impact on nearly every facet of German life.
Prisons, as functions of the social, political, and economic times and places in which they
exist, were naturally affected by this change. Though trace elements of communist values
and policies no doubt remained in post-Unification Germany, capitalism was now the
norm—economically, politically, and socially. In a capitalist democracy, power is
theoretically spread out among the people, or at least among certain people. Though East
Germany had been run by a very controlling central government, the ways in which
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power changed hands after Unification served to advantage some people and
disadvantage others. For women, and in many ways for people in the prisons, this power
shift left them grappling for new identities and roles within the new, unified Germany.

Chapter Three: Gender, Criminality, and Social Welfare in Post-Unification
Germany, 1995-2012
I. Introduction
In the two decades since German Unification, the country has seen tremendous
economic, social, and political growth. In the dark days of the European financial crisis,
Germany has stood out as a rock of economic and political stability, and has proven its
importance in the international market. To most of the world, Germany now seems to be
one smoothly running, unified nation. Within Germany, however, there remains a
significant discourse surrounding the phenomenon of Mauer im Kopf (“wall in the
mind”), which describes the continued shared mental sense of division between East and
West Germany, despite the lack of physical or political borders. This
wall in the mind of East versus West may be a more lasting
barrier to political progress than was the concrete barrier
that fell in 1989-90. Politically, the wall in the mind may
affect basic attitudes toward policy priorities, the definition
of democracy, and the evaluation of the political system.
(Hofferbert and Klingemann 2001, 365)
For instance, when asked if they placed greater value on freedom or equality, the majority
of Germans in both East and West answered that they favored equality—but this majority
was much more pronounced in East Germany (Hofferbert and Klingemann 2001, 365).
Though capitalism may have spread to East Germany, socialist ideology continues to play
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a role in citizens' relationships to their government throughout Germany. Additionally, it
could be argued that the economic instability of surrounding European nations has
brought Germany together in a new way. Though unemployment and poverty remain
higher in East Germany than in West, the strength of the nation as a whole in relation to
its neighbors has had a positive effect on the national climate, and has brought new
international attention to Germany. No longer is news from Germany based primarily on
the Cold War division; now, Germany's latest Wirtschaftswunder and its bolstering of
Ireland, Greece, and Italy dominate the press.
With the well-publicized recent successes of Germany, however, have come some
troubling new trends. Since Unification, Germany's prisons have continued to grow in
number and in population—and women's prisons and housing units have been no
exception. Though any expansion of the prison system seems problematic, Germany has
at least countered this growth with a great deal of development in programming, funding,
awareness and accommodation for the specific needs of incarcerated women. As a result,
many of the policies and practices in place in Germany today are quite progressive and
work to appropriately address the needs of incarcerated women. And while an
understanding of the specificities of incarcerated women's unique situations has proven to
be quite beneficial to women in German prisons, there is even now an unease in Germany
around the concept of incarcerated and “criminal” women: though the state tends to
productively resocialize them, society still struggles to reconcile conceptions of
femininity with those of criminal activity.
Furthermore, women in prisons today largely tend to be those who have fallen out
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of the definition of “successful” as it is conceived of in collective German society—or
who were never a part of this definition to begin with—and who have failed the German
standards of what constitutes a good citizen and what constitutes a good woman. This
seems to be tied to the developments explored in the previous chapters: idealized roles for
women in Germany were being defined and redefined for them, leaving many
disenfranchised from the system. Thus, while the resocializing aspects of the criminal
legal and penal systems work to bring these women back into the folds of German
society, it is a state and a place that many of them never inhabited in the first place.
Herein lies an essential weakness in Germany's otherwise-prospering system: it continues
to neglect the needs of its most underprivileged women, far before they are ever
incarcerated. Through this chapter, I argue that if a country is only as strong as its most
underserved citizens, then women in German prisons are likely one of the most
appropriate markers of Germany's success—or failure, as the case may be.
Additionally, this chapter provides the crucial last piece of this thesis' overall
argument by demonstrating the results of Unification and the uniqueness of the
contemporary German women's prison system. This system, built by capitalism and
communism, then taken over and reformed by capitalism, has nevertheless been
influenced by these two economic systems and their effects on women, society, and views
on crime and punishment.

a. Method and Structure
The intention of this chapter is to bring the reader up to date on women's prisons
in contemporary Germany, a task that both brings a more immediate relevance to this
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project on the whole, as well as illuminates the consequences and outcomes of
Unification in the realm of women's incarceration. I argue that the positionality of
incarcerated women in Germany, while much improved and better recognized than in
years past, is still one that is somewhat marginalized and underserved. The plight of
incarcerated women in Germany reveals the extent to which the strength of Germany's
social market economy still fails or succeeds to reach its most underserved and
marginalized citizens.
To this end, the chapter begins with a description of post-Unification Germany's
incarceration ideology, which focuses primarily on resocialization and rehabilitation. This
helps ground the rest of the chapter in the current moment and provides a framework
through which to view the actual conditions in women's prisons today. The discrepancies
between ideological goals and actual practices are telling in and of themselves: to what
extent do economic, political, and social conditions enable or prevent intended outcomes?
A theme throughout the chapter is that of programs and policies that reflect this ideology,
but that are hindered by Germany's increasingly liberalized fiscal policy.
Next, the chapter presents information on the current state of Germany's women’s
prisons and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of such a system. Many of the
strengths and weaknesses overlap; this is indicative of the complex nature of
incarceration in Germany, and of the lack of an absolute scale by which to evaluate these
practices. As a continuation of this topic, the chapter includes information on the regional
variations and racial demographics of women's prisons in the country, utilizing a
comparison of the most populous states in the Eastern and Western halves of Germany.
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Additionally, the chapter provides an overview and analysis of the current work
being done within Germany and Europe towards the improvement of incarceration
practices, along with descriptions of pop cultural representations of incarcerated and
'criminal' women in Germany today in order to further contextualize crime and,
specifically, women's criminality, within the German national consciousness. These two
aspects of public perceptions and attitudes towards women's prisons present a holistic
view of Germany's relationship with its incarcerated women; once again, it is a very
complex relationship, and reveals many inconsistencies and discrepancies in the role of
prison and incarcerated women in the German cultural, political, social, and economic
landscape. The chapter concludes with an exploration of what these current incarceration
practices reveal about womanhood in Germany today, and how femininity and crime are
still seen as being at odds with one another. This brings up questions about the state of
gender and womanhood in Germany today, and of the ways in which crime is still
normalized as “masculine” behavior.
This chapter primarily utilizes recent studies and reports from Germany and
Europe that analyze specific elements of women's incarceration. While there are many
such studies, none have succeeded in critically examining criminal legal practices in the
context of current German incarceration ideology: one that claims to focus on
resocialization and rehabilitation. Nor do any of these studies even attempt to draw
connections between prison and crime and the larger German political, social, and
economic climate, as this thesis aims to do.
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II. Incarceration Ideology and Goals
There are two main goals of incarceration in Germany: resocialization of the
individual, and protection of the public from further crimes committed by the individual
in question (Heinz, 4). The basis for this resocialization objective “is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution, yet can be inferred from the judgments of the Federal
Constitutional Court as an inalienable constitutional principle derived from human
dignity and the principle of a welfare state” (Dünkel et al. 2005, 13). This commitment to
a welfare state is an essential component of the German psyche, and sets the country
apart from other capitalist nations—the United States, for example. Within Europe, this
emphasis on resocialization seems to be found primarily in eastern, previously Soviet
states. In addition to Germany, “Slovenia, Croatia and Lithuania.... clearly promote the
concept of resocialization as the only aim of imprisonment. Even though the laws do not
expressly use the term of resocialization, it is apparent that all aim to re-integrate the
prisoners” (Dünkel et al. 2005, 14). Thus, it seems likely that these goals are remnants of
the former East Germany and that there has been a certain amount of socialist influence
spread from East Germany into West Germany since Unification. One should keep in
mind, however, that West Germany—even before Unification—was not a truly liberal
capitalist nation; there were, even then, elements of social welfare in policy and national
opinion. Resocialization as an aim of prisons existed in both East and West Germany
prior to Unification, but it has gained much greater prominence in recent years, likely as a
result of this socialist influence.
In addition to resocialization, rehabilitation, and reintegration, the “final aim is the
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detention and custody of prisoners, which corresponds to the role of imprisonment in
Germany as a provider of security” (Dünkel et al. 2005, 14). The safety of society is of
concern, yet the fact that security is of secondary importance to the German penal system
indicates that reintegration of incarcerated individuals is seen as more beneficial to
society in most cases. Though many might see this as also being a remnant of formerly
totalitarian East German prisons—institutions that certainly contained a number of
contradictions—the pouring of West German resources into security increases in these
Eastern prisons directly after Unification complicates this assumption. It is possible, then,
to conclude that such an emphasis on security is largely a result of Western influence, and
that it has become a more central part of official incarceration ideology in the Eastern
states only since Unification and the Western officials' securitizing renovations of Eastern
prisons.
What is missing, then, from official stated goals of the German criminal legal
system is an attempt at retribution or punishment. Though in reality an element of this
likely does exist—German prisons, while much more comfortable and resembling of the
outside world than many other western prisons, are by no means luxurious—its exclusion
from official criminal discourse is certainly of significance. However, this brings up some
critical questions about the philosophical nature of punishment: if retribution and
punishment are not (stated) goals of incarceration, then what is the logic behind
incarcerating non-violent offenders? It seems that a system that truly had no regard for
penalizing the perpetrators of crime would have little to no interest in placing people into
forced custody at all. Unless Germany is following the model of many addiction
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rehabilitation centers, in which a central component of an individual's recovery is
predicated on the removal of him or her from their normal environment for a period of
time, there is likely still an underlying motivation to punish people for their actions.4
One more important point is the explicit connection between capitalism and
incarceration. Unlike many of its western capitalist counterparts, the relationship between
private corporate interests and prisons in Germany is much more obscure. All
correctional institutions in Germany—including closed prisons, open prisons, and
mother-child institutions “are run by the state. It is a strongly held principle that the state
should never give up its monopoly in the use of force and the control and treatment of
deviance. Hence, examples of prison privatization offered by the United States, the UK
and France, for the time being at least, are regarded with suspicion” (Messner 1995, 133).
This public ownership of all prisons—for men and women, open and closed—means that
private capitalist interests have only a very minor influence on the building and
administering of German prisons. This resistance to privatization is also likely a lasting
effect of communism, and has had the positive outcome of reducing corporate lobbying
influence over incarceration and sentencing legislation.

III. Profile of Women, Crime, and Incarceration in Germany
As of 2008, women made up 4,089, or 5.4% of the 75,719 incarcerated
individuals in Germany (Fair 2008, 98). In 2005, women had constituted just 5.1% of the
German prison population; between 2005 and 2008, there was therefore not only a
numerical increase in incarcerated women, but also a proportional increase (Dünkel et al.
4

Interestingly, the German word for crime is Straftat, which literally means “punishable act”.

95
2005, 19). Still, in the last several years, incarceration rates for women in Germany have
hovered around 10 incarcerated women per every 100,000 women in the general
population (Dünkel et al. 2005, 19). Women's rates of court-mandated prosecution and
incarceration are not, however, in full alignment with their involvement in criminal
activity: while 23% of people who commit crime in Germany are female, only 15% of
people who are convicted of crimes in Germany are female, and, as previously stated,
only around 5% of the incarcerated population in Germany is female (Grote-Kux 2007,
2). This discrepancy is likely due to a variety of factors, the primary reason being that
property and drug crimes, which women in Germany are most often convicted of,
generally carry very short sentences. Under German law, these short sentences are often
commuted to fines and probation, in which cases women are able to avoid incarceration
altogether—and are therefore denied access to many of the vocational, educational, and
mental health opportunities that criminal legal institutions have available to incarcerated
women.
A large percentage of women incarcerated in Germany are housed in women's
wings of men's prisons. In 2006, there were forty-six women's units in men's prisons
throughout Germany, with an additional six institutions strictly for women (Grote-Kux
2007, 4). As of 2007, there were a total of seven women's prisons throughout Germany,
as well as many more units specifically for women within men's prisons (Universität
Bremen 2007). Until 2005, there was even a co-ed prison in Hamburg that had little to no
restrictions separating men and women (Universität Bremen 2007). Out of the
approximately 4,200 spaces available for incarcerated women, nearly 700 are located in
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open prisons; ninety-three spaces, meanwhile, are located in mother-child facilities
(Grote-Kux 2007, 4). The majority of women incarcerated in Germany are serving time
for non-violent offenses. In a sizable scientific sample of incarcerated women in
Germany, 36.0% were incarcerated for property crimes, 28.8% were incarcerated for drug
offenses, 14.4% were incarcerated for robbery, 9.0% were incarcerated for homicide,
7.2% were incarcerated for assault, and 4.5% were incarcerated for other offenses (Fair
2008, 99 & Dünkel et al. 2005, 23). By another criminal legal scholar's estimate, most of
the crimes committed by women in Germany are property crimes, drug crimes, child
abuse and neglect, immigration crimes, and homicide (Grote-Kux 2007, 3). Either way, it
is clear that the vast majority of women are serving time for non-violent offenses, and
that a large number of these women are even incarcerated for arguably victimless illicit
substance infractions. This reflects the economic desperation of many of these women
prior to their incarceration, and points to the tardiness of the German government's
intervention in their lives. In this way, it exposes the inefficacy of Germany's welfare
programs; while they may help a broad swath of poor or unemployed Germans, they are
failing to reach the most underprivileged and overburdened women, who in turn must
engage in criminal activity in order to survive.
In addition to the economic desperation present in many incarcerated women's
lives, drug addiction plays a large role in their experiences—both inside and outside of
the prison space. Drug use and abuse in prison is dangerously high in Germany and
across Europe; in European prisons, 50% of women have a history of drug abuse
(Zurhold et al. 2011, 50). Among incarcerated women in Germany, the majority had
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started their drug careers as early as 13 and 14 years of age
–many have used drugs for 10 years or more. Other
research in Germany had revealed connections between
drug career and poverty, violence, auto-aggression and a
lack of resources.... While 18% of women prisoners are
there due to the use or trafficking of drugs, it seems that
many more consumed drugs and—usually imprisoned for
theft—committed actually drug-related crime in order to
secure their needs.... About 60-80% of women in prison
have a drug problem. (Toth 2005, 12)
This clear connection between economic positionality and participation in the drug trade
is further indication that the German welfare system is leaving behind certain women,
and the continued increase in incarceration seems to show that this negligence is growing.
Additionally, this problem is specific to women: drug use among the female prison
population is much higher than that of the male prison population—between 35 and 70%,
as compared to between 10 and 40% (Fair 2008, 100). This disparity has some alarming
implications. First, that the underlying reasons for women's greater drug use in prison are
not being addressed, and that incarceration likely exacerbates them. Second, the fact that
many women struggle with these addictions leads to more restrictive prison experiences
and fewer opportunities for job training and family interactions, since “prisoners with
drug or alcohol problems will not be put in open prisons” (Fair 2008, 100). While these
policies might have been enacted with the intent of reducing access to illicit substances
for those who use and abuse them, the result is a decrease in the resocializing effects of
incarceration and of the maintenance of supportive social and familial relationships.
The role of women as victims is still prevalent even for those in prison. Among
incarcerated women in Germany, rates of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse histories
are high. In one prison, approximately 50-75% had been sexually abused in their lives
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before prison (Fair 2008, 100). This, again, points to a failure of the German government:
the legal system steps in too late for these women, and is thus unable to prevent such
abuse or to punish the perpetrators before these women enter into cycles of abuse and
crime. Fortunately, the prisons seem equipped to handle these women's histories, as
treatment needs of the women inside reflect many of the traumas they have experienced:
in one study of incarcerated women in Germany who were undergoing treatment while in
prison, “24.6% were being treated for drug abuse, 19.3% were being treated for
psychological problems, and 4.5% were being treated for medicaments (pharmaceutical
drug abuse), and 0.9% were being treated for alcohol abuse” (Dünkel et al. 2005, 23). It
is promising that this treatment is generally available for women, as this fact aligns these
prisons with their stated goal of rehabilitation.
In the GDR prior to Unification, there was only a minor correlation between
education and incarceration among women; the socialist distribution of labor and wealth
lessened the impact of undereducation—and tended to prevent it in the first place. This
correlation was larger in the FRG before Unification, and continues to play a large role in
crime and incarceration in Germany today. A large proportion of incarcerated women are
undereducated: while about 62% finished their primary schooling after attending for 9-10
years, only 7% had actually graduated from Gymnasium with an Abitur, the test required
to continue on to study at a university in Germany. Meanwhile, nearly 25% had attended
school for less than 8-9 years and had not finished their education (Dünkel et al. 2005,
21). While the German education system today has an internationally acclaimed
apprenticeship system and does a very effective job of educating its youth and preparing
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them for the labor market, incarcerated women seem to have fallen through the cracks—
years before their involvement in the penal system. This neglected positionality is
perhaps related to the disenfranchisement of many women throughout the Unification
period, as described in the previous chapter; though many feminist groups in the late
1980s and early 1990s had hoped to enact legislation that would both directly and
indirectly address the needs of Germany's most vulnerable women, the exclusion of these
activist groups from the capitalist political sphere delayed or precluded many of this
legislation from being pushed through. This was a large component of the pervasive
disadvantaging of women throughout the Unification process, and though improvements
certainly seem to have been made in the overall social, political, and economic welfare of
women in Germany since that time, incarcerated women have not yet received adequate
support in order to thrive in the contemporary state.

IV. Strengths and Weaknesses of the System
a. Strengths
1. Focus on Rehabilitation and Resocialization
Perhaps the most positive facet of German prisons today is this focus on
rehabilitation and resocialization. These objectives, while inspired by the social welfare
ideologies of modern Germany (an ideology that was partly influenced by East
Germany), are supported by several practical aspects of German prisons. One such aspect
that particularly enables resocialization to occur is the size of each institution:
German prisons are generally much smaller. Only 10
German prisons have more than 500 inmates and none
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have more than 1,200 inmates.” Additionally, for both men
and women, adults and juveniles, “there are no militarystyle boot camps...At times when there has been a serious
crime committed by a juvenile in Germany, or during times
of an election, such discussions have arisen. But the move
to develop boot camps has never materialized. (Dammer
2011, 1023)
The commitment to smaller prisons that do not aim to indoctrinate women into
militaristic attitudes or force them to perform exhausting, rote tasks, is essential to the
model of incarceration that was present in both East and West Germany prior to
Unification: that a period of incarceration be minimally punitive, and instead focus on
building useful skills for successful reintegration upon release. This focus on skill- and
resumé-building job training and experience remains central to the German prison
experience today. It is “typical in Germany for inmates to have some form of work or
program to occupy their time in a productive manner. In fact, in some German
correctional facilities, all (100%) of the inmates participate in some work or productive
programming” (Dammer 2011, 1024). Women are not sitting idly in prison for years at a
time; their time, while generally kept to a few short months, is generally spent gaining
productive skills in order to successfully reenter society. Of course, just as East and West
German vocational training in prison reflected their respective ideologies of womanhood
and female labor, today's training is indicative of current national ideals of women's labor
and aims to produce the optimal German woman upon release.
2. Administrative Support and Accountability
There are a variety of laws governing women's incarceration. The Prison Act, of
course, is applicable to women's prisons as well as men's. Additionally, there are certain
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provisions within the Prison Act that specifically apply to women's incarceration,
regulating gender separation, pregnancy, birth, motherhood, maternity rights, birth
registration and announcement, mother and child programs, and preventative detention
(Grote-Kux 2007, 3). The following measures have already been implemented, or are in
the process of being implemented in German women's prisons: consistent review and
evaluation of laws and their implementation through a gendered lens, the placement of
highly qualified and well-educated personnel in women's prisons, the building of
rehabilitative programs for incarcerated women, the creation of outpatient care centers,
more extensive networking with outside sectors, the creation of more coherent
supervision and support structures, a gendered restructuring of therapy and treatment
opportunities, the development of administrative safety provisions in favor of social
security, the placing of women in programs that allow for the highest possible level of
independence, minimum standards for women's prisons, an expansion of the capacity of
open prisons for women, an increase in mother-child programs, and greater freedom for
incarcerated mothers (Grote-Kux 2007, 8-9). These are all extremely positive steps, and
reflect a relatively recently heightened awareness of the gendered needs of women in
social and governmental institutions throughout Europe. This awareness has trickled
down—though wealthy women in Germany have long had their needs met or at least
partially attended to, poor and incarcerated women, as we have seen, have been
administratively and legislatively underserved. These new programs and initiatives show
an increase in attention to their unique needs in a way that is both care- and socialwelfare-based.
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3. Vocational and Educational Opportunities
In today's capitalist Germany, “women still earn less, are more likely to work part
time and less likely to hold top jobs” (Bennhold 2012). To some extent, prison labor
reflects this reality. Job opportunities for incarcerated women in Germany are less
available, less abundant, and less compensated than those for men in German prisons—
yet they have nevertheless been heralded as better than those for women in many other
European prisons, and are certainly better than they were in West Germany before
Unification. Women in German prisons gain “benefits from the job centre (e.g.
unemployment benefits) or social welfare benefits” (Toth 2005, 60). While in many
European prisons, “the range of work available for women inmates was predominantly
unskilled and focused on traditional women’s work: mostly on housekeeping jobs
(cooking, cleaning, laundry), assembly-line work in light industry or packing,” Germany
stood out as offering a much wider range of vocational opportunities for incarcerated
women (Toth 2005, 39). In Germany, the promotion of these varied vocational skills
“proved to be very useful for reintegration: women with such a training and experience
gained in prison managed to find work after release” (Toth 2005, 42). In one German
prison in a former West German state, a program “is carried out through which skills and
educational background of the women are assessed and further development needs are
identified for the duration of imprisonment – which also facilitates building bridges
between internal programs and employment” (Toth 2005, 46). In this way, reintegration is
further emphasized and concrete connections are made between job training in the prison
and employment upon release. Additionally, women (and men) who worked in prison are
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eligible for unemployment benefits upon release, a policy that seems to recognize and
take into account the realities of reintegration, giving formerly incarcerated individuals a
greater chance at eventual successful resocialization (Toth 2005, 56). It should be noted,
however, that current unemployment rates are not particularly high in Germany. In fact,
while women's unemployment in Germany is 5.4%, for men it is 6.0% (Eurostat 2012).
This bodes well for women recently released from prison, and is perhaps partly due to the
successful reintegration efforts of the German criminal legal system. It is also a sign that
German women are interested in and able to find work in the country. This trend is
divided along East-West lines, however. East German women today continue to be more
committed to working outside of the home than their West German counterparts, and
“exhibit a ‘stubbornness’ in altering their employment patterns” (Matysiak and Steinmetz
2008, 332). It is perhaps in part due to this stubbornness, as well as to remaining socialist
attitudes in many German employers that cause them to favor women's employment, that
women who do want to work outside of the home are generally able to do so.
German prisons have also shown a dedication to improving the literacy and
education levels of their incarcerated women. In a European study of women's prisons,
“providing primary education to all prisoners and focusing especially on the elimination
of illiteracy was reflected in all country reports as a priority for education in prisons.... A
more flexible, so-called modular approach to education was applied in some prisons in
Germany.... which enables people with short sentences to start certain modules at flexible
times, and if necessary, proceed on other modules after release” (Toth 2005, 42). Such
programs have proven to be effective at integrating the educational process into the lives
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of incarcerated women—lives that are often more complicated and transient than those of
women in Germany who have never entered the criminal legal system. In addition to this
flexible module system, a variety of practical courses, such as technology/computer
courses, are available for women in prison. This commitment to these sorts of educational
programs in prison is something that has vastly improved from the days of preUnification prisons in both East and West Germany, when a “socialist” reeducation
dominated programs in the former and domestic training was primarily accessible in the
latter.
4. Human Rights
Human rights groups at both the national and European level have set certain
standards advising prison administrators' policy- and decision-making, though
enforcement is chronically lacking and implementation is therefore inconsistent. When
making new criminal legal policy in any European country, “the attention of the legislator
is likely to be focused particularly on the European Prison Rules (EPR).... An important
general principle of the EPR is that ‘prison conditions that infringe prisoners’ human
rights are not justified by lack of resources’” (Dünkel 2007, 359). These prison rules
seem to incorporate socialist and capitalist elements of incarceration, though the majority
seem to be Western-based. In some northern European countries, so-called principles of
normality, or in the case of Germany, alignment, play a large role in how prisons operate.
Such principles state “that the conditions of living in prison should approximate as far as
is possible those of living in freedom” (Dünkel et al. 2005, 16). For many incarcerated
women, however, this is a complicated objective, as many lived in conditions of poverty
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and drug use prior to their incarceration. Still, this concept of “freedom within the prison”
is one that has led to many successful open prisons in Germany. These open prisons and
the comprehensive reintegration that they promote are perhaps the greatest contributions
to the unified criminal legal system that West Germany has made.
5. Social Services Inside
Social services inside German prisons are an integral part of the resocializing
goals of the system, and women's prisons are no exception. For women's prisons, therapy
is particularly essential, as the majority of incarcerated women in Germany have histories
of abuse, addiction, and mental health issues. On average, a co-ed prison with around
“500 inmates has four working psychologists. If it is a special therapeutic prison, then
there are usually many more—one for every 15 inmates and, in juvenile prisons, one for
every 50 inmates” (Dammer 2011, 1022). Therapy is approached from a medical
standpoint in the prisons, and is generally quite effective in this sense:
The prison’s impact on health condition is an area where
according to most reports, a differentiation has to be made
between various groups of women. For some women who
suffered from poor health either due to lack of resources/
insurance or led a lifestyle that destroyed their health (e.g.
drug users), the prison was found to offer health services
and, potentially, treatment that led to an improvement or
stabilisation of their health condition. In the German
research, the majority of the women who suffered from
addiction stated that their health condition improved during
imprisonment, and the overwhelming majority of women
with addictions believed that imprisonment had a
controlling and limiting affect on drug-taking. (Toth 2005,
29)
Though this is a rather glowing report of German prisons, statistics showing rates of drug
use in prison seem to contradict the claim that most incarcerated women found that
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prison time reduced their drug abuse. The offering of no-cost, effective physical and
mental health care for incarcerated women is, however, a very positive step, and seems to
reflect a distinctive socialist attitude towards such social services.

6. Contact with Outside World
Maintaining contact with the outside world is of vital importance to incarcerated
individuals, particularly women, who tend to be particularly interdependent for survival
in western capitalist societies. German prisons seem to recognize this to a considerable
degree; through prison leave and somewhat frequent family visits, social and familial
relationships do not suffer as greatly as in more isolated prison systems in other
countries. In both men's and women's prisons in Germany, “prisoners have twenty-one
days of leave per year and extra leave may be granted for special reasons including
family events. Prisoners from the open prison in Freistaat Thüringen can go out to visit
family at weekends” (Fair 2008, 99). In addition to personal leave,
women in some cases had access to programmed leaves,
during which, accompanied by prison personnel, they could
familiarise themselves with the environment or engage in
activities with organisations. Short leaves—without
supervision—in order to facilitate women’s gradual
readjustment, as well as the reestablishment of social
contacts and practical preparation of release, are also
available in most countries. Day-releases practised in
Germany.... were considered to be very useful by the
women to maintain social contacts, visit authorities, or start
organising other aspects of life after release. (Toth 2005,
48)
Widespread implementation of these productive and beneficial leaves within women's
prisons has been fairly recent, and seems to have originated in West Germany's men's
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prisons. The use of day-releases is particularly successful in facilitating smooth and longlasting reintegration upon release. Ultimately, this practice seems to effectively keep
women in contact with families, despite the placement of many women's facilities far
away from urban areas where families often live. A majority of women incarcerated in
German prisons “had regular contact with their families, either through visitors or oneday weekend visits home” (Toth 2005, 25). The maintenance of familial and other
relationships is vital to any care-based system that values interdependence and
relationality, as Germany's social welfare institutions generally at least purport
themselves to do.
7. Positive Relationships with Personnel
Another success seen by Germany's women's prisons can be seen in the relatively
positive relationships that many incarcerated women perceive to have with prison
administrators and staff:
Women tend to accept the disciplinary role of prison and
most of them aim at building workable relationships with
personnel – it is apparently a key condition for survival. In
many cases, women talked rather appreciatively about
personnel and emphasised that prison staff reacts the same
way to prisoners as they approach them. In particular, the
German research reflected rather positive relationships
between women inmates and personnel—as reported,
women felt that staff members were available and helpful,
communication was open and based on partnership. In a
German prison efforts were made to integrate women’s
opinions into the shaping of prison life. (Toth 2005, 28-29)
These generally open and mutually respectful working relationships between incarcerated
women and prison staff members, while far from perfect, have been shown to be an
invaluable aspect of successful reintegration, as women in German prisons are able to

108
express their problems to and seek help from staff members, educators, and guards within
the prisons (Toth 2005, 46). Specifically, “the co-operation with probation and ‘external
advice services’ worked well according to most agents – although some pointed to the
consequences of budget cuts in enabling less frequent visits to prisons, and interviewed
women confirmed that probation officers are overloaded by case numbers as high as 200.
Yet, a number of interviewed women in Germany believed that it was possible to get help
in prison and secure access to flats and jobs” (Toth 2005, 50-51). Budget cuts, as we will
see later, seem to be a major factor in decreasing the effectiveness of certain aspects of
the German prison system, even those with the most potential for success.
8. Reintegration
What many of these positive aspects point to is the relative success of German
prisons with meeting their primary goal of incarceration: reintegration. This process
begins in the prison, with decreasing security and increasing independence as release
approaches. This
support in preparing for release was evaluated to be better
in Germany by the interviewed women, especially women
who were released from the social-therapeutical institution
appraised positively the help received. They emphasized
the individual attention received from therapists and social
workers as well as the gradual release from the institute. In
the past seven years the Berlin institute has only reported
about one woman’s return to prison. (Toth 2005, 46)
Low recidivism rates are perhaps the best marker of a resocialization-oriented prison's
success, and Germany seems to be particularly strong in this regard.
One of the main components of the state's resocialization of formerly incarcerated
women is through probationary supervision and guidance. The supervision element
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seems to often be more emphasized than that of guidance, however. Probation officers,
with whom German women are only occasionally in contact, are thought of “by some of
the women in Germany.... as a control function primarily” (Toth 2005, 55). It seems that
this infrequent contact shows a lack of concrete support by these officials, who are not as
active in the reintegration process as they would perhaps need to be in order to be an
effective resource. Though this irregularity seems to be of concern to some, it does not
appear to render the entire probation system completely ineffectual. Studies “indicate that
it is not impossible to reconcile the control function of probation officers with an
effective support function: at least some of the interviewed women considered probation
agents to be useful as sources of information and yet others developed a closer, trusting
relationship with their probation officers” (Toth 2005, 63). Additionally, the lower
frequency with which the officers check up on the women could have a very positive
effect on their independence and sense of self-reliance.
Housing support is of vital importance to women working to rebuild their lives
after a prison sentence. Among other European states,
Germany should be mentioned as probably one of the few
positive examples in housing solutions: a regulation
ensures that the rent of the imprisoned is paid for one year,
and also, housing departments seem to offer tangible help
for those released in finding affordable accommodation.
Several women in Germany reported that their flats were
maintained during imprisonment or that they found flats
quickly after their release with the help of social services,
NGOs or the housing department. (Toth 2005, 57)
Though budget cuts were again mentioned as endangering the extent to which these
services are able to be carried out, they seemed nevertheless to be generally well-liked by

110
formerly incarcerated women.
A final difficulty of reintegration, but one that the German system has tried to
quell, is difficulty in finding work due to stigmatization. This can be “a real difficulty,
although the German regulations require the applicant to inform the employer only in
certain cases about their record” (Toth 2005, 59). These limitations on the extent to which
employers are permitted to inquire about a woman's criminal record are vital for women's
ability to become gainfully employed upon release.
9. Programs for Incarcerated Mothers
By far one of the most promising aspects of Germany's criminal legal system for
women is the prevalence of mother-child programs throughout the country. This is a
central issue to the lives of incarcerated women in Germany; many of them are mothers
of minor children, with 37% of these children living with their fathers, 32% with
grandparents, and 17% with adoptive parents (Dünkel et al. 2005, 22). The fact that a
large proportion of these children still live with their fathers seems to indicate both a
flexible parental role between men and women in Germany, as well as the success of
mother-child programs at minimizing the disruption of families during the mother's
incarceration. Motherhood in Germany is highly esteemed, though support for mothers
outside of prison has declined considerably since Unification—particularly for East
German women, who had previously had reliable, free childcare and a plethora of other
governmental benefits. Differences remain between East and West Germany's childcare
options and motherhood trends, however. One study on women's employment
discrepancies between East and West Germany in recent years noted that East German
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women have retained many of their socialist attitudes about women working outside of
the home; as a result, they are less likely to leave the workforce after marriage or
childbearing, and support regional childcare policies. For this reason, they “are still
provided with far better childcare opportunities than their West German counterparts”
(Matysiak and Steinmetz 2008, 334). Even with such programs still in place for some
women, birth rates across Germany are incredibly low, and the lack of social and
governmental support for mothers is one of the primary causes. For women in prison,
programs that assist or enable their ability to provide care for their children are especially
vital, though they by no means make up for the lack of comprehensive motherhood
support that these women are offered upon release.
There are a total of six mother-child prison housing programs throughout
Germany, primarily in the open prisons (Junker 2010, 262). These housing programs are
considered to be some of the most progressive and comprehensive in the world, in part
because they have been set up to accommodate women of all security levels (Kauffman
2001, 64). Eight of the German states offer mother-infant units, and in many cases,
children as old as six years old are allowed to live with their mothers in open prisons. The
regulating of such programs varies throughout the country, as individual states are
responsible for their administration (as they are for the administration of prisons in
general) (Fair 2008, 99). One of the strengths of such programs is the availability of
specialized staff members who help women learn or improve their childcare skills.
Pregnant women and women with infants are sent to these units so that they can begin
such childcare training from the beginning of their child's life. Though not all women are
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eligible for such programs, even
high-security women who must remain within the confines
of the prison's ancient walls are permitted to keep children
up to age 3, though, in practice, most are under 2. Mothers
and children reside in a separate building on the prison
grounds known as the 'closed mother-child house'. Babies
remain with their mothers during the day, but toddlers go to
the 'open mother-child house' or neighborhood preschool
while their mothers work at the prison. (Kauffman 2001,
64)
The widespread application of such programs seems to be particularly positive, as it gives
a broad range of women the opportunity to form and maintain relationships with their
children—relationships from which both the mothers and children benefit. For women
who are considered to be a low security risk, there are open mother-child houses. In such
cases, “the large wall that surrounds the prison has been indented on one side and in that
space is nestled the 'open house,' which faces the surrounding neighborhood, rather than
the prison” (Kauffman 2001, 64). This arrangement allows both mother and child to live
in a way that theoretically most resembles a non-prison environment. Additionally,
children are involved in playtime, preschool, and field trips that foster their early
development in natural and productive ways.
In addition to mother-child units, day-leaves from the prison are quite helpful in
allowing mothers to maintain contact with their children. Germany recognizes
motherhood as a legitimate occupation, and thus allows these home visits as part of their
work-release programs:
On the radical premise that parenting and housework are as
valuable labor as working in a factory or fast-food
establishment, mothers who are eligible for work release
can leave the prison daily to work for their own families.
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They must rise at 5 a.m. and take public transportation to
their children's homes in time to roust them out of bed for
school. Once the children are fed, clothed and out the door,
mothers are responsible for housekeeping, shopping, and
general household management.... When their children
return from school, the mothers are responsible for their
supervision, doctor's appointments, cooking, homework and
all the myriad tasks that consume parents' time and energy.
Once their children are tucked into bed, the mothers leave
them in the care of another adult family member or
caretaker and return to the prison to sleep. (Kauffman 2001,
64)
This woman-friendly conception of work, though apparently not available for men,
acknowledges the essential caring roles that wives and/or mothers often play in their
households. Additionally, this practice is in many cases also available to women who
have ill family members—therefore recognizing that women often are responsible for the
care of more than just their children (Toth 2005, 26). Whether or not these practices keep
women limited to certain prescribed feminine roles seems less important, in this situation,
than the fact that they reflect the vital role that many women played in their families prior
to their incarceration, and that they allow them to continue to support their children and
relatives in this way.

b. Weaknesses
Due in large part to the unique incorporation of both capitalist and communist
approaches to incarceration, German women's prisons today have developed into a
generally successful system that promotes reintegration and resocialization. Though this
criminal legal system seems to be one of the best in the world in many respects, it is
certainly not without fault, even in areas where it ranks well relative to other western
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countries' systems. The following problems were cited as affecting women's prisons in
Germany: unnecessarily high security measures, no awareness of women's institutions as
being independent facilities, being far removed from home and community, a large
number of individuals with drug addictions, a large number of individuals with histories
of sexual and physical abuse, a large number of individuals with physical and
psychological issues, and a lack of education and job-training opportunities (Grote-Kux
2007, 5).
1. Substance Abuse
A striking issue in the German women's prisons is the rampant drug use.
According to German criminologist Theresia Höynck, over half of all women in German
prisons have serious drug habits or addictions. In every prison, drugs are being smoked,
and in many, there is also heavy use of needle-injected drugs. Some of these prisons have
recognized the issue and have needle exchange programs in place to combat HIV and
Hepatitis transmission (“Keine Veranstaltung von Klosterschülerinnen” 2002). Despite
certain efforts to combat the issue, such as these needle exchange programs, a large
number of women in Germany who want and need treatment for substance abuse and
other psychological issues while in prison are not being provided this treatment (Dünkel
et al. 2005, 26). Furthermore, “in some German prisons there is not even a drug-free
wing” (Zurhold et al. 2011, 51). This shows an inability by prison staff and administrators
to truly understand and address the epidemic. Sadly, the easy availability of drugs in the
prisons is in many ways simply a symptom of the fact that many incarcerated women had
drug habits and/or dependencies before (and, unfortunately, also after) coming to prison,
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and where there is a strong demand for illicit substances, a supply is almost certain to
follow.
2. Distance from Home and Community
The relatively small number of women incarcerated in Germany proves to be an
issue when considering the proximity of prisons to the homes and families of incarcerated
women. According to German incarceration philosophy, “one of the principles of
imprisonment is to imprison prisoners as close to their homes as possible,” though this is
often not possible, due to the fact that such a minority population can be placed in only a
very small number of institutions throughout the country (Fair 2008, 100). In this way,
women are further marginalized by incarceration than their male counterparts. While the
small numbers of women in prisons is partly to blame for this dislocation, it has been
further exacerbated by the decision to build several women's prisons far “from urban
centres, sometimes in locations not accessible by public transport and not offering
opportunities for work outside the prison, social contacts etc. This is highly problematic
in case of low-security regimes, or open regimes – since such a location fully contradicts
the objective of reintegration emphasised in cases of open or light regimes” (Toth 2005,
33). This is a prime example of a concept—open prisons that facilitate smoother
reintegration—whose implementation has been hindered by the realities of the system. At
best, poor planning and the challenge presented by relatively small numbers of
incarcerated women are to blame. At worst, a deliberate obstruction of resocialization
ideology is at work. In light of the myriad other programs that have been successfully
implemented in the interest of resocializing, the former seems more likely. It is hard to
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argue that more prisons would be a positive development, but German prison authorities
and legislators should be aware of the practical inefficacies of open women's prisons and
work to find creative solutions to the problem.

3. Poor Job Opportunities
In addition to this dislocation from urban centers and from their available job
opportunities exist other barriers to women in German prisons finding productive and
well-compensated work, both during and after their incarceration, with the result of there
being far fewer educational and job training opportunities for women in prison than for
men (“Keine Veranstaltung von Klosterschülerinnen” 2002). As women's unemployment
rate outside of prison is .6% lower than men's, this seems to be a problem particular to
prisons (Eurostat 2012). Short sentences play a large role in this inequality: half of
women in German prisons are serving less than nine months, reducing the timespan in
which to provide training and pre-release job skill-building. Additionally, many women
inside lack previous work experience—at least in paid workplaces outside of the home.
For prisons that do not offer women the chance to be compensated for their duties as
mother and/or wife, this can prove to be a problem for job placement. And finally, the
high number of instances of drug addiction in women's prisons or wings is a clear
hindrance to successful work. Occupational therapy, a potential solution to many of these
problems, is now less available due to budget cuts (Toth 2005, 40). Also at play is the
tension between traditional domestic tasks and paid labor. While mothering and other
care-based occupations are important and reflect the family role of many incarcerated
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women, there is a fine line between validating the value of this work and keeping women
limited to it. While German prisons seem to offer more opportunities for skilled and
varied labor than many of their European neighbors, “the standard jobs also in Germany
continued to be cleaning and assembly line jobs”—which serve neither the women's
interests nor their families' (Toth 2005, 39).
Regardless of the type of work women in prison are doing, it is still chronically
underpaid (Toth 2005, 40). Incarcerated women's wages are low to begin with, but are
stretched even thinner once taxes and social security, and in some cases fees for prison
upkeep, are paid. With any money left over, women may buy basic toiletries or other
necessities in the prison store or send money home to their families; “thus, women cannot
make savings from such wages for their life after release.... Women who already
struggled with indebtedness are not able to stabilise their situation and may accumulate
further debts through not paying interests” (Toth 2005, 41). The issue of exploitation—
and of an inconsistency with the supposed reintegration goal of the prisons—is
particularly problematic in light of this barely compensated labor. Furthermore, these
issues do not appear to affect German women on the whole, indicating a particular
vulnerability of incarcerated women, perhaps stemming from their relative invisibility
inside the prison space. As with the job opportunities for women in prisons in East and
West before Unification, working opportunities and conditions for women in German
prisons today lag behind or are simply out of touch with the true realities of women's
labor outside of prison.
4. Budget Cuts
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Budget cuts are a running theme throughout many of the critiques of the German
prison system, and they seem particularly to affect women in German prisons. Though
quite “comprehensive and numerous programs are available, budget cuts and lack of
personnel cause permanent problems in the actual delivery of such programs” (Toth
2005, 52). So-called social training courses and vocational training courses are thus often
times combined, leaving both skill sets somewhat neglected (Toth 2005, 50). Proper job
opportunities and placement have also suffered from such cuts. Many women in closed
prisons who are eligible for daytime work-release are being denied such possibilities due
to a lack of staff supervision and other resources (Toth 2005, 40).
Such inadequacies in staffing are correlated with an increase in incarcerated
women. With this increase in prison population—and without an increase in funding and
resources—chronic overcrowding has occurred. Though prisons were initially built with
each cell having the capacity for one person, this has long since not been the case, even
now in women's prisons, where overcrowding has become a major issue (“Keine
Veranstaltung Von Klosterschülerinnen” 2002). This displays a certain level of inattention
to the current state of women's incarceration in Germany by lawmakers and prison
administrators.
5. Women's Wings of Men's Prisons
It is widely believed that the relative lack of independent women's prisons—that
is, those that are not simply a wing of a men's or co-ed prison—is the root, or at least a
contributing factor, in many of the issues facing women incarcerated in Germany today
(Toth 2005, 39). This issue affects not only the 65% of incarcerated women in Germany
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who are housed in such wings, but also reduces resource distribution for the remainder of
women who are housed in their own separate institutions (Grote-Kux 2007, 4). Women's
wings in men's prisons are generally far less able to cater to the specific needs of the
women inside: as a result, budget planning, social and vocational training, and lower
security standards are forced to be more aligned with the larger men's sections of these
prisons (Toth 2005, 35). While this situation is disadvantageous for incarcerated women
in Germany, the reason for it is hard to fault: there are simply not enough women in
German prisons to warrant the building of numerous new facilities. A solution, it seems,
would be to create and utilize more small-scale alternative custody arrangements, such as
open prisons and mother-child units, both of which would decrease the number of women
being housed in high-security men's prisons.
6. Issues with Release
Despite Germany's best intentions of resocialization,
many women have reported that they were lost and
disoriented in the first few weeks if not months after their
release, and experienced even basic life situations often as
unmanageable challenges.... Women upon leaving prison
have a combination of the following issues to take care of
at once: ensure housing, regular income, heal relationships
with and provide for children or other dependent family
members, and break relationships with drugs, related
neighbourhood- and friendship circles.... As some reports
pointed out, as soon as they leave prison, women are
overburdened with the gravity and combination of these
issues to be solved by them at once – an unrealistic
expectation that would put a performance pressure on even
people with much more resources and support. (Toth 2005,
52-54)
Many women, who experienced a loss of contact with many of their family members and
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friends during their incarceration, find that they often have diminished support systems
upon release. This is especially difficult when there exists a certain degree of
stigmatization for formerly incarcerated women in Germany, making the forging of new
support systems difficult (Toth 2005, 52). A society or community that does not fully
welcome formerly incarcerated women back into its folds will consistently hinder its
prisons' efforts to facilitate this resocialization.

V. Regional and Racial Discrepancies
a. East and West Germany
Though a full analysis of each of the East and West German states would provide
thorough information about the differences remaining between the two regions, such an
analysis would require extensive and incredibly complex calculations. Instead, it seems
quite adequate to look at the two most highly populated states in East and West German,
respectively. In East Germany, this is Saxony; in West Germany, it is North RhineWestphalia. Saxony is admittedly just a fraction of the size and population of North
Rhine-Westphalia, but this is in and of itself a significant marker of the differences
between East and West Germany today. While Saxony's mere 4.3 million inhabitants
pales in comparison to North Rhine-Westphalia's 18.1 million, it is nevertheless the
largest of the five former GDR states.
Saxony has a total of ten correctional institutions, only three of which contain
women (Ziegler 2008, 6). Out of a total of 3,641 incarcerated individuals in the state, 268
are women (Justiz in Sachsen). This is 7.4% of the total prison population in the state, an
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above-average percentage for Germany. In addition, the total number of incarcerated
individuals in Saxony actually dropped significantly—from 4,341 to 3,641—between
1998 and 2008, yet the number of incarcerated women in the state rose from 146 to 248
during that same period. This is a large shift, and seems to signal an increasing propensity
towards incarcerating women, despite what looks like a drop in crime (Justiz in Sachsen).
In North Rhine-Westphalia, meanwhile, a total of 37 correctional institutions
house 16,800 people. Out of this total prison population in the state, 974 are women—
making up only 5.8% of the North Rhine-Westphalia prison population, much closer to
the national average than in its Eastern counterpart (Justizministerium NRW 2012). Much
of this is likely due to persistently better economic conditions and vocational
opportunities in the Western states, and perhaps also to a consistently more 'Western'
view of women and their level of involvement in crime—as seen in the FRG's preUnification prisons.

b. Foreign Women in German Prisons
Germany's prisons contain a higher proportion of foreign individuals than the
country as a whole. The same is true for women's prisons. Europe-wide studies show that
around one-third of foreign women in European prisons are incarcerated for drug-related
offenses, and while this percentage is comparable to that for all incarcerated women in
Germany, the former is made up of a large number of international drug trafficking
sentences (Weltgesundheitsorganisation 2009, 19). Statistics for foreign incarcerated
women in Germany are difficult to obtain. In North Rhine-Westphalia, 23% of
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incarcerated women are non-German (Justizministerium NRW 2012). Corresponding
information for Saxony is unfortunately unavailable. More than anything, this seems to
speak to the invisibility of this large demographic. Undercounted and underserved, these
women are an overrepresented minority in a prison system that makes few concessions
for their particular needs.
Many of these unique needs involve the difficulties associated with remaining in
touch with family and community members during a period of incarceration, since many
foreign women in German prisons are thus detained in a different country than their
families, who may be still at home (Toth 2005, 25). Despite the relative ease of
communication available to native German women in prison, this service is much less
accessible to their foreign counterparts: “the financial burden of long-distance calls from
German prisons is.... a difficulty for foreign women in prison” (Toth 2005, 25). This is
alarming, as it shows one of the many practical inequalities in programming and services
available to the growing population of foreign women in German prisons. The language
barrier is another problem facing many foreign women in German prisons. However, this
is one that is at least partially addressed in many women's facilities, where German
language courses are available for many foreign women (Toth 2005, 43).
The issue of resocialization as it pertains to foreign women in German is
particularly complex, however, as their positionality in Germany—outside the prison—is
different from that of native German women. Turkish-German women, for example, are a
battleground upon which the clash of Islamic and Christian values are fought—though it
should be noted that both Germany and Turkey are considered extremely secular, and that
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these different values are more cultural than religious. Given this context, for German
prisons to resocialize Turkish-German women through the same model of womanhood
and citizenship as non-immigrant women in Germany seems highly problematic. It also
causes one to question whether the incarceration of immigrant women is part of an
attempt by the German government to claim some sort of cultural ownership of or power
over women of color and immigrant women in Germany.

VII. Activism and Public Perceptions of Prisons
a. European Standards and Regulations
There is a great deal of collaboration among scholars, researchers, and activists
around issues of women's incarceration among several of the states in the European
Union. These cooperative efforts have been focused towards both the collection of
information as well as the creation and influencing of criminal legal policy in the EU and
in individual states. Many of the facts specifically about women's prisons in Germany
have been gleaned from inter-European studies, which compare and contrast the
situations in each country in order to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of
each system, as well as to form beneficial partnerships with one another.
Several attempts—a number of them successful—have been made to create
international standards and solutions for the problems occurring in the individual states.
There is, of course, the “question of what benefit could international standards be in the
face of the heterogeneous legal reality in the various countries,” not to mention differing
social, economic, and political realities (Dünkel et al. 2005, 9). Yet, “despite the
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differences in cultural and socioeconomic background the basic problems in many
countries can be compared with one another: overcrowding of prisons and a lack of
subsidization and the resulting effects on the furnishing of buildings, the staff situation as
well as training and work opportunities” (Dünkel et al. 2005, 9). For incarcerated women
specifically, all countries share the reality that this is a small percentage of the population,
and that many of the problems specific to them are thus not being given adequate
attention (if any at all) (Dünkel et al. 2005, 9). In light of these overarching
commonalities, “internationally accepted minimum standards are important—even when
they are not legally binding by international law, they can develop moral authority, and
can be used in international collaboration as a common basis for legal reforms and for
further training programmes, etc.” (Dünkel et al. 2005, 9). These standards and guidelines
are, however, most effective when contextualized within each state's economic, political,
and social realities.
The following represent gender-specific elements of “the UN standards, European
Council principles, and CPT (Committee for the Prevention of Torture) standards”: a
“ban of discrimination and the principle of separation”, which states that women may not
be discriminated against on the basis of gender, but that men and women must be housed
in separation facilities; “protection against abuse,” which includes that which is leveled
against incarcerated women by both guards and fellow inmates, and which thus mandates
that incarcerated women never be left alone with male staff members or guards; “security
measures,” which emphasize that incarcerated women should not automatically be
subject to the same level of security as incarcerated men; mandates that staff members be
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particularly sensitive to the special needs of incarcerated women, and that said staff be
made up primarily of women; “access to activities,” which describes the extent of useful
activities and job opportunities to which women should have access; “contact to the
outside world”; “protection of pregnant women/mothers and the interests of the
children”; and standards of health care and conditions, which includes regular and
unfettered access to feminine hygiene products (Dünkel et al. 2005, 10-12).
Gabrielle Grote-Kux, in advocating for the implementation of European gendermainstreaming practices in Germany's women's prisons, calls for the following measures
to be taken in order to improve the conditions for incarcerated German women: the
continuation and extension of transnational collaboration with other women's prisons,
including regular meetings with representatives of other regional, national, and European
women's prisons (Grote-Kux 2007, 6). Additionally, a number of guiding principles of
gender-responsive strategies for addressing the specific needs of women in German
prisons have been established. These include the acknowledgment “that gender makes a
difference,” and the creation of the following objectives for women's prisons: that the
prison environment should be one that is based on “safety, respect, and dignity,” that
programs and policies be designed to support and foster relationships with family,
children, and other support networks, that sufficient services be available for the
treatment of mental health issues and substance abuse, that vocational and educational
opportunities for incarcerated women work to improve their socioeconomic status, and
that the model for the prison be one that is based on community and collaboration
(Dünkel et al. 2005, 39). These guidelines seem care-based and consistent with the aim of
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resocialization and rehabilitation in a specifically gendered context.

2. Pop Cultural Representations
There exists a small number of widely varying pop cultural representations of
prisons in Germany, particularly of women's prisons. Hinter Gittern—Der Frauenknast
(Behind Bars—The Women's Prison) was a popular soap opera that ran for sixteen
seasons from 1997 until 2007 (Hinter Gittern—Der Frauenknast. Drama). The show
seems to have been created with the concept of a violent men's prison in mind, without
much consideration for the specificities and particularities of women's prisons. This
representation of criminal women and incarceration is at odds with the ways in which
women are actually treated in the German prison system, and seems to reflect a large
disconnect between the public and prisons. Such a disconnect indicates a level of
invisibility of incarcerated women, as popular constructions of women in prison must
rely on images that are wholly inaccurate.
On the other end of the scale, a more recent mini-documentary series called
PodKnast, shown primarily on YouTube, presents interviews and reality-television style
short episodes (approximately 5-6 minutes each) featuring incarcerated young adults in
the West German state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The project began in 2008 and has
been filmed in eight different prisons in the state, including the women's prison in
Cologne. The issues explored in their videos about women's prisons include those of
pregnancy, childbirth, and vacation days (in which the women leave the prison for a day
to visit family members). The goal of the series seems to be primarily to educate the
public on prison realities, and to reduce much of the stigma surrounding incarceration.
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Such a project seems particularly valuable in light of the popularity and singularity of
shows like Hinter Gittern as representations of German women's prisons.

VII. Womanhood and Incarceration in Germany: The Bigger Picture
A larger question raised by the contemporary German prison system for women is
of what the system indicates about the current state of gender and womanhood in
Germany. One way to answer this is to explore the various theories for why there has
been such an increase in women's incarceration in the past few decades. This debate
has been dominated by two paradigms during the last
decades: The 'power-paradigm' predicted a steep rise of
female crime rates as a result of the thorough change of
gender roles in this period, while the 'victim paradigm'
directed attention to rising rates of alcohol and drug
addiction as well as mental health problems and suicides
among women. Both paradigms have been linked by the
proposition that the low involvement of women in crime
was compensated by their higher rates of all types of
passive problem behavior like depression or addiction.
(Karstedt 2000, 21)

There is, however, no evidence proving that either of these paradigms has had any causal
effect on women's crime or incarceration (Karstedt 2000, 25). In fact, there seems to still
exist a tendency towards leniency for women when their cases are being prosecuted in
Germany, as “the decision-making programs of public prosecutors and court judges are
designed in such a way that decisions are mainly based on the personality of offenders as
well as on predictions of their future legal behavior, and much less on the offense”
(Karstedt 2000, 26). Furthermore, a large number of the crimes for which many women
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in Germany are incarcerated were committed by, or at the very least with, male intimate
partners, even more reason to question the extent to which 'emancipation' is responsible
for women's criminal behavior (Toth 2005, 16).
The continued socioeconomic inequality facing women in German is one of the
largest factors contributing to women's perpetration of what is considered criminal
activity. A “dominant majority of the women.... indicated a subjective experience of
poverty, and also the majority of the women suffered from indebtedness.... The great
majority of the women received welfare payments from the state, and many lived
exclusively on such state support.” This, along with statistics revealing the
undereducation and underemployment of women in German prisons, seems to indicate
that “they had been already excluded from the labour market several years earlier,” if not
for their whole lives (Toth 2005, 6).
Additionally, both the power and victim paradigms lack an exploration of the
social, political, and economic factors leading to increased incarceration—factors that
may cause increases in incarceration that are independent of increases in crime. As
previously mentioned, the number of women involved in criminal behavior in Germany
is far greater than that of those incarcerated. Thus, it is easy to imagine that the
relationship between these two numbers has fluctuated over the years in response to shifts
in sentencing practices and various other phenomena.

VIII. Conclusion
How well does the German women's prison system align with its stated goals of
resocialization and societal protection? From the information in this chapter, it is clear

129
that the success of Germany's ability to resocialize and rehabilitate its incarcerated
women is complex and neither fully effective nor a complete failure. Incarcerated women
in Germany are certainly given some opportunities to resocialize, but budget
inadequacies and a larger system of marginalization prior to and after their incarceration
make this endeavor quite difficult at times. This shows a level of negligence or
deprioritization on the part of the German state—perhaps driven, or at least enabled, by a
certain level of ignorance among the general public about the realities of incarcerated
women's lives.
The task set out in the previous chapter was to track the changes between the
bifurcated prison systems in East and West Germany prior to Unification and the
supposedly unified system present in contemporary Germany. Many of the difficulties
facing women during Unification seem to have been resolved; after all, Germany now has
a female Chancellor (from East Germany, no less) and has achieved relative—though by
no means full—degrees of political, economic, and social parity for women and men. The
experiences of incarcerated women in Germany expose the most severe of the remaining
weaknesses in women's positionality in Germany, though mitigated somewhat by the
prison's focus on resocialization and rehabilitation. This focus, one of the most positive
aspects of incarceration to have survived the complex process of unifying the prison
system throughout Germany, is one that is consistent with Germany's current identity as a
social welfare market, and has led to the creation of many successful criminal legal
programs and policies. These developments further substantiate this study's prevailing
argument that a state's social, political, and economic realities are both reflective of and
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reflected in its prison system, demonstrating the absolute importance of looking to
Germany's incarcerated women in order to gain a full understanding of the current state
of German democracy.
Though Germany is still in many ways made up of two distinct halves, the
decentralization of prison authority throughout the individual states has made an analysis
of East and West German prison systems much less relevant than before the fall of the
Wall. Socially, the states are beginning to blend even further. Politically, East Germany is
taking the stage. As this chapter is being written, a new German president has been
appointed, a man who was born and raised in the GDR. With the two heads of the
German state hailing from this former communist country, the merger seems to be closer
to completion than ever before. The prison system, too, seems finally to be moving
towards this goal of merging Eastern and Western correctional ideology. Elements from
both systems can be seen in Germany's women's prisons of today. There is a focus on
productive education and work that had not been present in West Germany's women's
prisons prior to Unification, while security standards have been loosened in many
women's facilities to a degree unheard of in communist East Germany. The overarching
goal of incarceration is reintegration into German society, but German society is quite
different than it was in either East or West before 1989. West German women have
gained a greater degree of employment equality than they'd had before the fall of the
Wall, while East German women have more freedom to organize publicly and to express
their experiences through writing, art, and political action. But despite these progressions,
many women are still falling through the cracks in German society, landing eventually in
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prison. Such “criminal” behavior still labels its perpetrators as deviant, not only as
citizens, but also as women; criminality and femininity are still at odds. Germany is
trying to understand the needs of such deviant women, but has a long way to go in order
to sufficiently improve their lives and positionality in the unified state, over twenty years
after the Wall came down. In this way, Germany's strength as a nation is undermined;
until it meets the needs of its most underserved women, it will never reach its true
potential as one of the world's leading social welfare market states.
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Conclusion

Although German Unification has often been called the Peaceful Revolution, it
brought with it the spread of some of capitalism's many discontents. The prison system
has grappled with how best to reconcile the realities of crime and incarceration in a
capitalist state with certain ideological and physical remnants of its Eastern half's
communist past. A criminal legal scholar wrote that
the legal is an ideological form (of economic revolution).
This is not to say that it is merely mental. It has a material
reality in the form of police and prisons and guns and
courts and legislators and law books and the rest. What is
crucial is how this material reality is shaped, and for that
we must understand how ideology is shaped. (Reiman
2003, 208)
The material reality of German women's prisons has been largely determined by
their ideological foundations, and by the historical developments that have produced
these ideologies. The German women's prison system, as this thesis has demonstrated, is
complex and imperfect, yet in many ways very progressive. It is the result of the last sixty
years of tumultuous German history, and has been uniquely shaped by the capitalist and
communist histories of the once-divided state. In its current state, it seems to have
incorporated elements of a supposedly “rational” or individualistic conception of
humanity as well as one that is relational and interdependent, thus promoting
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independence while still fostering and supporting care-based familial and social support
systems. In this way, it reflects the remarkable development of Germany since the end of
the horrific Second World War, providing a window into ideologies of gender, crime, and
incarceration as they evolved and eventually merged. Germany serves as an excellent
case study of the ways in which prisons are a product of their countries' histories, and is a
model for understanding how prisons around the world must be analyzed in the context of
their nations' past. Any attempt to compare prison systems across international borders
must be centered around the unique contextual development of each country and its
prisons.
In the first chapter, women's incarceration policies and practices in East and West
Germany were analyzed in the context of divergent constructions of gender, the role of
the State, and incarceration in the newly created communist and capitalist nations. In this
setting, women's prisons reflected these social, economic, and political constructions, and
attempted to mold incarcerated women into each state's respective model of ideal
femininity. In the East, this was a socialist worker—though the prison curiously neglected
the reality of women's lives as mothers, something that the government had highly
emphasized outside of the prison. In the West, women were to be domestic housewives,
and the limited education and vocational opportunities inside criminal legal institutions
reflected this ideal. In both cases, work opportunities and expectations inside and outside
of the prison were incongruent with one another.
Then, the second chapter acted as a bridge between the pre-Unification period
described in the first chapter and the post-Unification years explored in the third chapter,
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analyzing the impact of Unification on women in East and West Germany and on prisons
throughout both states. Due to a lack of information on women's prisons during this time,
the chapter tested the thesis' argument that prisons are a product of their social, political,
and economic histories by exploring the fate of non-incarcerated women and of prisons in
general during this period in order to see what impact the asymmetrical Unification
process would have on women's incarceration in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the East German government. It found that, just as women throughout
the country and people inside its prisons had been socially, politically, and economically
disadvantaged prior to Unification, this process served to disproportionately amplify this
marginalization.
Finally, the third chapter described contemporary German women's prisons and
the extent to which they reveal weaknesses in what is now a very strong, unified
Germany. Though all remnants of socialist and communist thought seemed to be highly
endangered during the early years of the Unification process, as seen in the second
chapter, certain elements of East Germany's ideologies have remained embedded in the
German state, as demonstrated by the prison system. This state, now a model of success
in Europe and beyond, has become undeniably economically, politically, and socially
strong. But, in light of its identity as a social welfare market state, certain populations
remain underserved. Though much has improved since the years immediately
surrounding Unification, the experiences of incarcerated women in Germany underscore
not only this neglect, but also the complex efforts that the German state have made or
attempted to make in order to better serve these women.
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Just as a study of the past sixty years of German history has provided an
explanation of the development of its women's prisons, scholars who are invested in
predicting the future of German prisons would do well to look at the trajectory of the
German state—and vice versa. In recent years, Germany has begun to gradually liberalize
its economy under the direction of a (relatively) conservative administration. Still, certain
social welfare programs have remained and likely will remain central to Germany's
political identity; one can only hope that the myriad care-based resocializing and
rehabilitating programs that are now so central to German prisons will continue to
develop with the support of the state. Germany, as with any country around the world,
will always be able to test its success as a true democracy by assessing the experiences of
its most underprivileged citizens: incarcerated women.
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